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I fly a good deal and my wife has instructions that if I go
down, she is to get in touch with a particular New York attor-
ney who is skilled in discovery, working juries, and conflict
of laws.'
I. INTRODUCTION
M ASSIVE INDUSTRIALIZATION and rapid advances in
communication technologies and transportation meth-
ods mean that today's transactions frequently transcend
state and national borders.' People move. Accidents occur.
Recovery questions are submitted to court and jury. The
increasing crossborder mobility implies that more often sev-
eral states might have an interest in a conflict of laws. The
location of the accident might be fortuitous, especially in
air transportation. The application of the traditional lex loci
delicti might be felt as a choice-of-law "anomaly."3
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Mass Torts and the Conflict of Laws: The Airline Disaster, 1 U.
ILL. L. REv. 157, 158 (1989).
2 See Feldman v. Acapulco Princess Hotel, 520 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1987).
Until the early 1960s, the traditional lex loci delicti rule prevailed both in Restate-
ment (First) of Conflict of Laws and among virtually every federal and state jurisdiction.
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In Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines4 the New York Court of Ap-
peals was the first court in the United States to find it "un-
just" and "anomalous" to subject the traveling New York
plane passenger to the varying laws of other states through
and over which he moved.'
Kilbergwas followed by a substantial line of other air crash
cases, which consistently challenged the traditional lex loci
delicti rule and which seemingly resolved the recovery
choice-of-law issue in favor of the law of the victim's or the
survivors' domicile or place of residence.6 Three decades
after Kilberg, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
remarkably concluded in Barkanic that "Kilberg and its
progeny are no longer good law."7 Barkanic involved a Chi-
nese airliner crash that killed two American businessmen,
citizens of the District of Columbia and New Hampshire,
respectively.8 Both victims had bought their tickets for the
China Airlines accident flight from Nanjing to Beijing from
a Washington, D.C. travel agent.9 Probably with Kilberg and
The rule called for the application of the law of the place of the injury, regardless of
the parties' domiciles or other states' interest in having their law applied. See Harold
L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 772, 776-77
(1983).
4 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 172 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1961).
5 Id. at 527.
6 See Allan I. Mendelsohn, A Conflict of Laws Approach to the Warsaw Convention, 33
J. AR L. & COM. 624, 627 (1967).
7 Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of China,
923 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Barkanic II].
8 See Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of
China, 822 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987) [hereinafter
Barkanic I]. Mr. Barkanic was employed by Beijing-Washington Inc., an export man-
agement company that promotes the export of machinery from the United States to
China. Mr. Fox, employed by Hollis Engineering Inc., accompanied Mr. Barkanic
for the purpose of giving technical seminars in different cities within China. See
Appellee's Brief at 4, Barkanic II (No. 90-7641) [hereinafter Appellee's Brief].
9 Barkanic I, 822 F.2d at 12-13. These tickets were written as separate transactions
(i.e., on different tickets from the purely international tickets). The respective fares
were calculated separately and the tickets bore the legend "RQY," which in airline
ticketing practice means that the domestic transaction must be confirmed by China
Airlines in China. The tickets issued in the United States were indeed changed as to
flight number and departure time and were eventually surrendered in their defini-
tive form upon boarding the accident flight at Nanjing. Furthermore, both tickets
were written as separate itineraries from the international itineraries which allowed
the victims to travel from the United States to Shanghai, the point of entry in China,
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its progeny in mind, the families of the American victims
brought wrongful death actions against China Airlines in
New York, seeking to recover $3 million (U.S.).lO However,
rejecting Kilberg and its progeny, the court applied Chinese
law limiting recovery to $20,000 (U.S) per foreign
passenger. 1
and to return, to the United States from Beijing and Shanghai, the respective points
of exit from China. Finally, Mr. Fox purchased his Nanjing-Beijing ticket from the
Washington, D.C. travel agent, while purchasing all his other tickets from a New
Hampshire travel agent. The purely international itineraries can be spelled out as
follows: Mr. Barkanic flew on Pan Am from Washington, D.C. to New York and on
to Hong Kong onJanuary 12, 1985; on January 14,1985, he flew from Hong Kong to
Shanghai on China Airlines; he was scheduled to fly on February 18, 1985, from
Shanghai back to Tokyo on China Airlines and back to Washington, D.C. on Pan
Am. Mr. Fox flew on January 6, 1985, from Boston to Taipei on Northwest Airlines
and to Hong Kong from Taipei on China Airlines; on January 14, he flew from
Hong Kong to Shanghai on China Airlines. He was scheduled to fly from Beijing to
Tokyo on Japan Airlines on January 12, 1985, and from Tokyo back to Boston on
Northwest between January 27 and January 29, 1985. See Appellants' Brief at 31-32,
Barkanic I (No. 86-7985) [hereinafter Appellants' Brief].
10 See Appellee's Brief at 3.
" See Barkanic II, 923 F.2d at 961-64. Under the purchase circumstances and con-
tract terms as described supra note 9, the accident flight does not appear to have
constituted "international transportation" to or from the United States within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention/Montreal Agreement. Article 1
defines "international transportation" as "any transportation in which, according to
the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destina-
tion, whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are
situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the
territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place
within a territory subject to the sovereignty... of another power .... Transporta-
tion to be performed by several successive air carriers shall be deemed.., to be one
undivided transportation, if it has been regarded by the parties as a single operation,
whether it has been agreed upon under the form of a single contract or of a series of
contracts, and it shall not lose its international character merely because one con-
tract or series of contracts is to be performed entirely within a territory subject to
the sovereignty... of the same High Contracting Party." Convention for the Unifi-
cation of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, opened for
signature Oct. 12, 1929, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934), 876 U.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49
U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention], and the Agreement Re
Liability Limitations, 44 C.A.B. 819 (May 13, 1966) (Docket 17325, Agreement CAB
18900, Order E-23680), 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 [hereinafter Montreal Agreement]. As
noted above, Barkanic's Nanjing-Bejing trip was certainly not written as a "domestic
segment" of a Warsaw Convention trip. The contract terms (separate fare calcula-
tion and no reference to the other tickets) and purchase circumstances (required
confirmation in China and different travel agencies in Mr. Fox's case) indicate that
at least China Airlines regarded the accident flight as a purely domestic flight and
not as a domestic segment of an international flight plan. Cf Hernandez v. Aer-
onaves de Mexico, S.A., 583 F. Supp. 331, 333 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (California residents
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This paper examines whether the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit correctly interpreted and applied the
New York choice-of-law method in Barkanic and whether
the New York Court of Appeals would reach the Barkanic
result if New York domiciliaries or residents were
involved. 12
Section I generally explores the evolution of the New
York choice-of-law approach since Kilberg in an attempt to
reveal the New York choice-of-law method as applied to the
air crash recovery issue.
Section II examines how the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit resolved the conflict of laws in Barkanic.
This section further explains how to situate the Barkanic
choice-of-law mechanic in the New York choice-of-law
evolution.
Section III reveals how Barkanic, to a certain extent, mis-
interprets the current New York choice-of-law method.
Subsequently, this section explores the Barkanic fact pattern
had purchased all their tickets through a California travel agency: from San Jose
(Cal.) to San Diego (Cal.) on Pacific Southwest Airlines; from San Diego to Tjuana
(Mex.) on Pacific Southwest Airlines; roundtrip from Tijuana to Monterey (Mex.)
on Aeronaves; and from Tijuana back to San Jose. The Hernandez court refused to
consider the domestic Mexican accident flight as a Warsaw Convention trip because
"the respective tickets ... contained no reference to one another," and therefore,
both parties did not regard the transportation as a single operation as required
under the Warsaw Convention). Id. An interesting question is whether the plaintiffs
in Barkanic could have turned the seemingly domestic accident flight into Warsaw/
Montreal "international transportation" by showing that China Airlines systemati-
cally required travel agents "to write all such domestic segments" as separate transac-
tions and separate itineraries even though they were to be flown in the course of an
otherwise international voyage, thus purposefully avoiding the higher Warsaw/Mon-
treal $75,000 (U.S.) damage limitation. The plaintiffs indeed submitted a discovery
request to the court in order to enable them to amend their complaint and assert a
$75,000 (U.S.) claim under the Warsaw/Montreal Agreement. See Appellants' Brief
at 29-30. It is believed, but cannot be confirmed, that the Barkanic plaintiffs eventu-
ally waived their fights to claim that the accident flight was a Warsaw/Montreal
flight in return for some settlement, the amount of which is under seal. Telephone
conversation with Daniel F. Hayes, Esq., Counsel for the plaintiffs (June 3, 1994).
12 Federal courts sitting in diversity cases must follow the choice-of-law rules of the
state in which they sit. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)
(citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1937)). See also AroChem Int'l,
Inc. v. Buirkle, 968 F.2d 266, 269 (2d Cir. 1992). Therefore, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals used the New York state choice-of-law rules to determine which law
governed the Barkanic and Fox wrongful death actions.
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under the current New York choice-of-law method in an at-
tempt to predict how the New York Court of Appeals would
resolve a Barkanic-type case involving New York
domiciliaries.
This analysis ultimately leads to the conclusion, in Sec-
tion IV, that whatever choice-of-law method is used, a court
will not be able to accommodate the conflicting policies in
a Barkanic-type case without impairment of essential state
interests and that, therefore, the supplemental compensa-
tion plan provided for in the Third Montreal Protocol of-
fers a very attractive alternative.
II. THE NEW YORK CHOICE-OF-LAW METHOD
SINCE KILBERG
A. KiLBERG & _PEARsO. THE "CONFLICTS REVOLUTION"
ANNOUNCED
Under the original Restatement of Conflict of Laws, the law
of the place of the accident determines "whether a person
has sustained a legal injury.""t In the early 1960s, two air
crash cases made some serious inroads into this doctrine.1 4
In Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines"5 a New York domiciliary was
killed when his flight, originating in New York, crashed in
Massachusetts. His representative sued the airline for
wrongful death in New York state court. The deceased had
bought his ticket in New York and had boarded the ill-fated
flight in New York. Massachusetts, the place of incorpora-
tion of the defendant and the place of the accident, had a
wrongful death statute limiting recovery to $15,000. New
York had a full recovery rule. The New York Court of Ap-
peals stated that the law governing a wrongful death action
" RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934).
' The "vested rights" doctrine was based on the premise that foreign law could
never operate outside the territory of the foreign sovereign and that the forum's use
of foreign law had to be explained in terms of the creation and enforcement of
vested rights. See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING
CONFLICT OF LAws 168 (2d ed. 1993).
1- 172 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1961).
1995] CHOICE-OF-LAW METHOD 765
was that of the place of the wrong.16 The court refused,
however, to apply the traditional lex loci delicti to the recov-
ery issue. 17 Instead, the court granted full recovery under
New York law by invoking a public policy exception 8 and
recharacterizing the recovery issue as "procedural" instead
of "substantive."1 9 First admitting that a significant number
of states still had a cap on damages in wrongful death ac-
tions,2° the court lost credibility when it subsequently held
that the damage limitation was "unfair and anachronistic" 21
or "absurd and unjust"2 2 per se. 23 What the court found so
anachronistic, absurd, and unfair was obviously not the for-
16 Id. at 527 ("[i t is law long settled that wrongful death actions being unknown
to the common law, derive from statutes only and that the statute which governs
such an action is that of the place of the wrong.") (citing Whitford v. Panama R.R.
Co., 23 N.Y. 465 (1861); Baldwin v. Powell, 61 N.E.2d 412 (N.Y. 1945)).
17 At the time Kilbergwas decided, the generally accepted First Restatement speci-
fied that the law of the place of the wrong (lex loci delicti) controlled the measure of
damages. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICr OF LAws § 412 (1934).
Is See Kilberg, 172 N.E.2d at 528. The court considered the New York public policy
against limiting damages recoverable in wrongful death actions as "strong, clear and
old," and refused to apply the Massachusetts cap on damages because the "damage
ceiling (at least as to our own domiciliaries) is so completely contrary to our public
policy .... " Id. In support of this holding, the court cited Conklin v. Canadian-
Colonial Airways, 194 N.E. 692 (N.Y. 1935), which held that a stipulation in the
airplane ticket bought in New York by the decedent, limiting defendant's liability for
negligently causing his death, which occurred in NewJersey, was not enforceable in
New York because it was contrary to New York public policy, although valid in New
Jersey.
19 Kilberg, 172 N.E.2d at 529. The court considered it open to the court "to treat
the measure of damages in this case as being a procedural or remedial question
controlled by our State policies." Id. It is worth noting, however, that to the extent
that Kilberg was based on the theory that the measure or extent of damages was a
procedural or remedial matter to be governed by the law of the forum, the decision
was disapproved the very next year in Davenport v. Webb, 183 N.E.2d 902 (N.Y.
1962).
2o Kilberg, 172 N.E.2d at 528 (noting that the number of states limiting death case
damages had become smaller over the years but that there were still 14 of them at
that time). Today, general limitations on amounts recoverable for pecuniary losses
have been repealed by all states. Maximum limitations remain, however, in the
wrongful death statutes of several jurisdictions for specific elements of damages and
in special situations (e.g., when the decedent left no spouse, child, or dependent
parent or for non-pecuniary damages). 3 MARILYN MINZER ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT
ACTIONS § 20.16, 20-43 (1991).
21 Kilberg, 172 N.E.2d at 527-28 (reasoning that the New York courts "should if
possible provide protection for [their] own State's people against unfair and anach-
ronistic treatment. . .
22 Id. at 528.
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eign law in itself, but the harshness of New York's own
choice-of-law rule which required the application of a for-
eign law in a case where New York was felt to have the pre-
dominant interest in the result.2 4
The second case, Pearson v. Northeast Airlines,25 which
arose out of the same air crash as Kilberg, was decided in
federal court shortly after Kilberg. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, compelled by Klaxon2 6 to use New
York's choice-of-law rules, reached the Kilberg result. The
court required plaintiff to sue on the Massachusetts wrong-
ful death statute but again refused on public policy grounds
to enforce its damage provisions.2 7 The federal court con-
cluded that New York - the domicile of both the decedent
and his widow, the place where the deceased had
purchased his airplane ticket, the state over which most of
the regularly scheduled flight occurred, and the state where
the defendant corporation conducted a large part of its
business - was "legitimately interested" in having its law
applied to the recovery issue.28
The Kilberg and Pearson courts enumerated several New
York contacts and seemed to consider New York's interests
in the recovery issue. They gave no general guidance, how-
ever, as to how and when New York's strong policy oppos-
ing recovery limits should apply, setting aside the
2- It is also worth noting that about four decades before Kilherg, Justice Cardozo
wrote for the New York Court of Appeals that "there [was] nothing in the Massachu-
setts [wrongful death] statute that outrage[d] the public policy of New York."
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918).
24 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 176; cf Cooney v. Osgood Machin-
ery, Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277, 285 (N.Y. 1993) (noting that "in earlier times the public
policy rationale really substituted as a choice of law mechanism when the prevailing
rigid choice of law rules permitted no flexibility"); see also Kilberg v. Northeast Air-
lines, 172 N.E.2d 526, 531 (N.Y. 1961) (Fuld, J., concurring). It is worth noting that
Judge Fuld was impressed by the theoretical soundness of the "more significant con-
tact" approach, an approach not surprisingly further developed and applied by
Judge Fuld in his Babcock opinion. See infra Part II. B.
25 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962) (en banc), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
26 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
27 See Pearson, 309 F.2d at 556-57 (allowing recovery of damages modeled on the
New York wrongful death statute, "although the Massachusetts statute still served as
the foundation for plaintiff's cause of action . . "); cf. Kilberg, 172 N.E.2d at 528.
28 Pearson, 309 F.2d at 557.
CHOICE-OF-LAW METHOD
traditional lex loci delicti rule. What contacts with New York
were required to trigger this policy? Was the fact that the
deceased and the plaintiff were New York domiciliaries nec-
essary or sufficient? Was some contact with the defendant
required? Did the defendant have to do business in New
York? If so, how much business was required? What if the
ticket had been bought outside New York and/or the plane
had been boarded in another state? Was it irrelevant that
the defendant was incorporated in the state where the crash
occurred?
The Kilberg and Pearson courts gave no criteria for a
guided analysis of any different fact pattern.2 9 Indeed, they
"merely grant[ed] courts a crude tool to do rough justice
- but not necessarily justice under law."30  Nevertheless,
Kilberg and Pearson had "[set the stage] for the judicial con-
flicts revolution." 31
B. BABCOCK: THE "CONFLICTS REVOLUTION"
The New York Court of Appeals reiterated its "Kilberg-
Pearson" rationale in Babcock v. Jackson,3 2 an automobile acci-
dent case involving a guest statute.33 Babcock promoted the
- See Feldman v. Acapulco Princess Hotel, 520 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480 (noting that the
early public policy exception "lacked a clear analytical base"); cf ANDREAS F.
LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS, 7-113 (2d ed. 1981) (noting that
"[i]t was not clear whether the [Kilberg] rationale was based on a balancing of inter-
ests between New York and Massachusetts, on a 'narrow provincialism' in favor of
the law of the forum, on a desire to protect [New York] plaintiffs . .. , or on a
changed emphasis on public policy... ").
o RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 160.
SI Friedrich K. Juenger, Babcock v. Jackson Revisited: Judge Fuld's Contribution to
American Conflicts Law, 56 ALB. L. REv. 727, 733 (1993).
32 191 N.E.2d 279, 285 (N.Y. 1963). Babcock involved injuries sustained by a New
York guest as the result of the negligence of a New York host in driving his car,
garaged, licensed, and insured in New York. The accident occurred in Ontario dur-
ing a weekend journey which began and was to end in New York. Ontario's guest
statute barred recovery. New York law allowed full recovery. The court applied the
law of New York, having "the dominant contacts and the superior claim for applica-
tion of its law." Id.
" Guest statutes were passed in the 1920s and 1930s to eliminate the liability of
motor vehicle drivers to their passengers except in cases of gross or willful negli-
gence. Such statutes were much criticized, and several states declined to apply the
guest statute of the lex loci delicti, invoking their public policy. See Barkanic II, 923
F.2d at 962 n.4 (referring to Melk v. Sarahson, 229 A.2d 625 (N.J. 1967); Clark v.
1995] 767
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"center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" doctrine as
"the appropriate approach for accommodating the compet-
ing interests in tort cases with multi-State contacts. ' 34 The
idea was that "U]ustice, fairness and 'the best practical re-
sult' may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the
law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or
contact with the occurrence or the parties [,] has the great-
est concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation. 3 5
Judge Fuld saw the merits of such a rule in that "it gives to
the place 'having the most interest in the problem' para-
mount control over the legal issues arising out of a particu-
lar factual context and thereby allows the forum to apply
the policy of the jurisdiction 'most intimately concerned
with the outcome of [the] particular litigation.' "36
All founders of the competing choice-of-law methodolo-
gies37 found the legitimacy for their respective "modern ap-
proaches" to conflict-of-laws in the Babcock "contacts-
interests-fairness" test.38  Professor Cavers saw triumph in
the court's rejection of the "vested rights" doctrine and the
Clark, 222 A.2d 205 (N.H. 1966)); see also Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 174 n.83 (not-
ing that, as ofJune 1, 1985, all but one of the 50 states had repealed their traditional
guest statutes).
4 Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 283. Judge Fuld expanded to a tort case the approach
that he had developed and applied before in Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y.
1954) (a contract case in which Judge Fuld adopted the "center of gravity" or
"grouping of contacts" doctrine). Judge Fuld had already promoted this doctrine in
his concurring opinion in Kilberg. See Kilberg, 172 N.E.2d at 531 (Fuld, J.,
concurring).
35 Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 283 (quoting Auten, 124 N.E.2d at 102).
" Id.
37 The modern choice-of-law jurisprudence, currently followed in 36 states, gener-
ally rejects the "vested rights" doctrine. The "vested rights" doctrine, still followed
by 15 states, underlies the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 377 (1934), which
states that the applicable law in tort cases is the law of the place of the last event
necessary to complete the tort. Professor Borchers divides the "modem approach"
into three main schools: the "Currie" approach (governmental interest analysis), the
"Reese" or "Second Restatement" approach (most significant relationship) and the "Le-
flar" or "better law" approach (choice-influencing considerations). See Patrick J.
Borchers, The Choice-ofLaw Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
357 (1992).
38 See Symposium, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict
of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1212 (1963) (with contributions by David F. Cavers, Elli-
ott E. Cheatham, Brainerd Currie, Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Robert A. Leflar, and Willis
L.M. Reese).
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'Jurisdiction-selecting" choice-of-law rules.3 9 The reference
to "interests" and "policies" must have sounded like "inter-
est analysis" music in Professor Currie's ears. 40 The propo-
nent of the "choice influencing considerations" or "better
law" methodology, Professor Leflar, particularly liked the
court's concern about "fairness" and its search for the just
and "best practical result."41  The citations to the eighth
tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,
with the adoption of the "most significant relationship" ter-
minology, were particularly welcomed by Professor Reese
and the proponents of the Second Restatement.42 Three de-
cades after Babcock, several scholars still found the "unbri-
dled eclecticism" the most remarkable feature of this case.43
Of particular importance, however, was the distinction
made by Babcock between conduct-regulating and loss-allo-
cating rules of tort law.44 The conduct regulating "rules of
the road"45 were still considered as most appropriately gov-
erned by the lex loci delicti.46 The "conflicts revolution" was
therefore limited to the field of the loss-allocating rules,
where Babcock's "contacts-interests-fairness" test had to
39 See David F. Cavers, Comment, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1219 (1963).
40 See Brainerd Currie, Comment, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1233 (1963).
41 See Robert A. Leflar, Comment, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1247 (1963).
42 See Willis L.M. Reese, Comment, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1251, 1253 (1963).
43 See Symposium on Conflict of Laws: Celebrating the 30th Anniversary ofBabcock v.
Jackson, 56 ALB. L. REv. 693 (1993); see e.g., the contributions by Professors Friedrich
K. Juenger, Patrick J. Borchers, and Harold L. Korn.
44 Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 284-85.
15 Compare the "rules of the air" in the Chicago Convention, providing that every
plane wherever it may be shall comply with the rules and the regulations of the state
over which territory it is flying or within which territory it is maneuvering. Conven-
tion on Int'l Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 12, 61 Stat. 1180, 1183, 15 U.N.T.S. 295,
304.
4 In order to avoid tortious injury on its territory, the accident state is indeed the
one most concerned with regulation of activity within its borders. Furthermore,
these rules are generally considered by people while acting (e.g., speed limits). See
Harold L. Korn, Big Cases and Little Cases: Babcock in Perspective, 56 ALB. L. REv. 933,
934 (1993); cf Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684-85 (N.Y.
1985) (holding that "when the conflicting rules involve the appropriate standards of
conduct, rules of the road, for example, the law of the place of the tort 'will usually
have a predominant, if not exclusive concern' because of locus jurisdiction's interest
in protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties who relied on it to govern
their primary conduct and in the admonitory effect that applying its law will have on
similar conduct in the future . . .") (citations omitted).
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guide the New York courts towards the most appropriate
law.
4 7
C. THE BABCocK APPROACH EXPANDED To THE AIR
CRASH RECOVERY ISSUE
Shortly after Babcock, the New York state and federal
courts broke the Babcock rationale free from the guest stat-
ute suit and applied it to wrongful death and survival ac-
tions, several of which arose out of air crashes.
In Long v. Pan American World Ainways48 the crash oc-
curred when a Pan Am airplane, en route from San Juan,
Puerto Rico, to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, crashed in
Maryland. The suit was brought in New York, Pan Am's
state of incorporation. Pennsylvania and Maryland em-
ployed differing damage measures, and a substantial recov-
ery was obtainable only under the laws of Pennsylvania.49
After acknowledging that "[there was no suggestion in
Babcock that its approach and principle were inapplicable to
actions for wrongful death," Judge Fuld concluded that
Pennsylvania had "the greatest concern with the matter in
issue and 'the strongest interest' in its resolution."50 The
17 Loss-allocating rules deal with the redress of injuries caused by the tortious con-
duct. Typical examples are the rules which determine the available relief, the kind
of compensable injuries, and the measure of recoverable damages. See Korn, supra
note 46, at 934; cf Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1967) (acknowledging that
"[f] imitations of damages... have little or nothing to do with conduct. They are
concerned not with how people should behave but with how survivors should be
compensated."). Id. at 730-31. See also Mascarella v. Brown, 813 F. Supp. 1015, 1021
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that "the rule [which] concerns the available remedies in a
wrongful death action .. . is unquestionably a 'loss allocation' rule").
- 213 N.E.2d 796 (N.Y. 1965).
49 Id. at 797 n.2. Maryland law generally only awarded for the deceased's con-
scious pain and suffering and a maximum of $1,000 of his funeral expenses. Penn-
sylvania, on the other hand, permitted an additional recovery for the present worth
of a decedent's likely earnings during his expected lifetime, diminished by the prob-
able cost of his own maintenance.
- Id. at 798. The court referred to a number of cases in which the question had
previously been considered and which had clearly indicated that the law to be ap-
plied was the law, not necessarily of the place where the fatal accident occurred, but
rather of the place having the most significant relationship with, and the greatest
interest in, the issue presented. Among the cases referred to were four air crash
cases: Griffith v. United Air Lines, 203 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1964); Tramontana v. S.A.
Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
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decedents were Pennsylvania domiciliaries who had
purchased their tickets in Philadelphia for round-trip
flights from that city to San Juan. The plaintiffs were Penn-
sylvania domiciliaries. The estate was administered in
Pennsylvania, and the airline was doing business in that
state. In contrast, Maryland's sole relationship with the oc-
currence was the purely "adventitious circumstance" that
the air crash occurred there.51
Simultaneously, a New York federal court applied the
Babcock approach in Ciprari v. Servicos Aeros Cruzeiro5 2 The
court applied Brazilian law, limiting recovery to seventy dol-
lars for a New York passenger severely injured in the course
of an airplane trip from Rio de Janiero to Sao Paulo. Inas-
much as the victim bought his ticket in Brazil as a fare-pay-
ing passenger on a Brazilian airline to a destination in
Brazil and was injured in Brazil, Brazil was considered to
have the greatest interest in the recovery issue.53
In Gore v. Northeast Airlines4 the wrongful death action
arose out of the same Northeast Airlines crash as in Kilberg.
This time, however, the court did not rely on the public
policy exception but examined the action "in the light of
the Babcock-Long criteria."5 The court applied New York
law where the victim was a New York domiciliary, even
though the victim's widow and children left New York and
became domiciled elsewhere after the accident.56
383 U.S. 943 (1966); Gianni v. Fort Wayne Air Serv., 342 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1965);
and Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816
(1965). Long, 213 N.E.2d at 799.
51 It is worth noting that, although Pan Am was incorporated in New York, Judge
Fuld considered New York a "neutral" and "disinterested" forum. The defendant's
incorporation in New York was considered "insufficient to warrant either application
of [New York] substantive law or interposition of [New York's] public policy." Long,
213 N.E.2d at 799 (referring to Kilberg).
52 245 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 359 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1966).
'5 Id. at 825.
- 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967).
55 Id. at 724.
- Id. The reader will notice that Gore and Kilberg ultimately reached the same
result under different choice-of-law methods. Kilberg applied the lex loci delicti rule
with the public policy exception while Gore applied the Babcock approach.
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In Miller v. Miller 7 the action arose out of a car accident.
The Court refused to apply the accident state's "absurd and
unjust" $20,000 damage limitation on wrongful death re-
covery. The Court thought it "fair" to grant unlimited re-
covery under New York law because the defendant had not
"patterned his conduct upon the law of the jurisdiction in
which he was acting"58 and because that jurisdiction "would
have no concern with the nature of the recovery awarded
against defendants who [were] no longer residents of that
State and who [were], therefore, no longer proper objects
of its legislative concern."5 9
In Thomas v. United Airlines"° the court refused to apply
the Illinois $30,000 (U.S.) damage limitation. The court
considered it "well settled ... that the fortuitous occurrence
of an accident [was] not, of itself, a sufficient basis for ap-
plying the wrongful death statute of a particular state."61
Further, the court referred to the Illinois choice-of-law ap-
proach that considered "the predominant interests to be
served on the issue of damages are those of the states con-
taining the people or estates which will receive the recover-
57 237 N.E.2d 877 (N.Y. 1968). Milerwas a wrongful death action resulting from a
car accident in Maine that occurred in the course of a short business trip in Maine.
The defendant driver and the deceased were brothers. At the time of the accident,
the defendant was domiciled in Maine; the deceased was a New York domiciliary.
Shortly after the accident, the defendant moved to New York.
M Id. at 881 (citation omitted) (noting that the Maine statute "is obviously not the
kind of statute... upon which a person would rely in governing his conduct"). The
court apparently considered the damage limitation provision in the wrongful death
statute purely as a loss-allocating rule. The defendant did not rely on this provision
while driving his car. According to the court, neither could the defendant have
relied on it while purchasing insurance, because at the time of the accident one
could buy only a standard liability policy covering both wrongful death (limited re-
covery) and personal injuries (full recovery).
59 Id. at 882. The court also took into consideration the change in Maine's law-
the damage limitation provision was abolished after the accident but before the
court decided the case.
- 249 N.E.2d 755 (N.Y. 1969). Plaintiffs were the representatives of four passen-
gers who were killed when a United Airlines Boeing 727jet crashed into Lake Michi-
gan, Illinois. The jet was on a scheduled flight from New York to Chicago.
61 Id. at 759 (referring to Kilberg and Long).
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able damages, if any, for their injuries or their decedent's
death."62
All these cases reveal an interesting trend. Where the
New York courts expanded the application of the Babcock
approach to the wrongful death recovery issue in air crash
cases, the choice remarkably resolved itself mostly in favor
of the law of the decedent's or beneficiaries' domicile or
place of residence.63
D. THE "NUMFIER RULES" OR "THE CONTRAREVOLUTION"
Babcock, unlike Kilberg and Pearson, gave guidance. A
"fair" choice-of-law had to be made based on a flexible
"contacts-interests-fairness" trilogy test. What Babcock of-
fered was not a "rule,"64 but an "approach."6 5 It seemed to
be a confusing approach, however.6 6 The confusion was
demonstrated in a decade of highly inconsistent decisions
in guest statute cases.67 Chief Judge Fuld decided to attack
62 Id. at 759-60 (quoting Manos v. Trans World Airlines, D.C., 295 F. Supp. 1170,
1173 (N.D. Ill. 1969)). In the large majority of cases, the deceased's state of domi-
cile will also be the state containing the people or estates receiving the recoverable
damages. But see Barkanic I, where a dependent survivor and plaintiff in the case,
Mr. Barkanic's mother, was domiciled in a different state. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 153, 162.
- Only Ciprai forms an exception; but it can easily be distinguished from the
other cases inasmuch as the victim bought his ticket in the state of the accident, and
the ill-fated flight was a purely domestic one that was not part of an interstate or
international flight plan. For later cases confirming this trend, see infra notes 140-
41.
" Professor Willis L.M. Reese, the reporter for the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) de-
fines a "rule" as a "formula which once applied will lead the court to a conclusion."
Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNEuL L. REV. 315, 315
(1972).
Id. (describing an "approach" as an expression of factors to be considered, such
as the factors listed in Section 6 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
or Leflar's choice-influencing considerations).
- See Peter Hay & Robert B. Ellis, Bridging the Gap Between Rules and Approaches in
Tort Choice of Law in the United States: A Survey of Current Case Law, 27 INT'L LAw. 369,
371 (1993) (remarking that Babcock was factually a simple case providing an inade-
quate rule for cases of greater complexity).
67 Only two years after Babcock, the New York Court of Appeals reached the oppo-
site result in a similar fact situation although claiming to follow its approach in Bab-
cock See Dym v. Gordon, 209 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y.1965). Dym involved a two-car,
instead of a one-car, accident and, unlike in Babcock, the plaintiff-defendant relation-
ship was formed in the accident state. The court tried to determine the location of
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this lack of judicial consistency by returning to a "rules"-
oriented choice-of-law method, the "Neumeier rules."
In Neumeier v. Kuehney8 Chief Judge Fuld crafted his
"Neumeier rules" to tackle the uncertainty and unpredictabil-
ity69 in the guest statute context.70  Using the inductive
method, he formulated a framework of rules based on the
previously acquired "Babcock approach" experience in deal-
ing with this type of case: 71
(1) When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domi-
ciled in the same state, and the car is there registered, the
law of that state should control and determine the standard
of care which the host owes to his guest;72
(2) When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his
domicile and that state does not cast him in liability for that
conduct, he should not be held liable by reason of the fact
the most significant relationship. Barely one year later, the court got back on the
real Babcock track when it refused to apply the law of the place of the accident in a
case very similar to Dym. See Macey v. Rozbicki, 221 N.E.2d 380 (N.Y. 1966). The
only factual difference from Dym was that the plaintiff-defendant relationship was
formed in the state of their common domicile. This time the court tried to deter-
mine the applicable law by a counting of the contacts with the interested states. A
few years later, Dym was overruled by Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1969)
(applying a government interest analysis, the court held that a common New York
domicile was controlling in guest statute cases).
-s 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972).
69 Predictability is generally considered "an important goal of the judicial pro-
cess." RiCHMAN & REYNoLas, supra note 14, at 235-36 ("Lack of predictability im-
poses social costs by increasing the risk incurred in planning consensual transactions
and in conducting and compromising litigation... [it] also increases the opportu-
nity for (and perception of) arbitrary judicial decision-making.").
70 In Neumeier, a domiciliary of Ontario, Canada, was killed when the car in which
he was a 'guest,' owned and driven by a New Yorker, collided with a train in Ontario.
The action was brought by the Ontario passenger's estate. The issue was whether
the Ontario guest statute applied and permitted the New York defendant to rely on
it as a defense.
7 Neumeier, 286 N.E.2d at 456-58 (noting that there is "no reason why choice-of-
law rules, more narrow than those previously devised, should not be successfully
developed, in order to assure a greater degree of predictability and uniformity, on
the basis of our present knowledge and experience"). Referring to his concurring
opinion in Tooker, ChiefJudge Fuld acknowledged that "the time [had] come ... to
endeavor to minimize what some [had] characterized as an ad hoc case-by-case ap-
proach by laying down guidelines . . . for the solution of guest-host conflicts
problems." Id. (citation omitted).
72 The first rule covers the "common domicile" cases and thus deals with false
conflicts under interest analysis (only one state has an interest in having its law ap-
plied to the issue presented).
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that liability would be imposed upon him under the tort law
of the state of the victim's domicile. Conversely, when the
guest was injured in the state of his own domicile and its law
permits recovery, the driver who has come into that state
should not-in the absence of special circumstances-be
permitted to interpose the law of his state as a defense;73
(3) In other situations, when the passenger and the driver
are domiciled in different states, the rule is necessarily less
categorical. Normally, the applicable rule of decision will
be that of the state where the accident occurred but not if it
can be shown that displacing that normally applicable rule
will advance the relevant substantive law purposes without
impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or
producing great uncertainty for litigants. 74
Chief Judge Fuld's "rules"-oriented method can easily be
reduced to what Professor Korn sees as "a common domi-
cile exception to the lex loci delicti."' 5  From the very mo-
ment they were handed down, the second and third
Neumeier rules have been targets of heavy criticism.76 Judi-
73 The second rule deals with "split domicile" cases where the law of the respective
domiciles respectively favors plaintiff and defendant. This rule deals with "true con-
flicts" under interest analysis - both states have an interest in having their law ap-
plied to the issue presented. Note that in Barkanic IIthe first sentence of this rule is
controlling. This first sentence is meant to protect party expectations. It gives de-
fendants the opportunity to plan their conduct in their home states relying on a
certain and predictable liability for their tortious actions. See Feldman v. Acapulco
Princess Hotel, 520 N.Y.S.2d, 477, 486 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
71 The third rule covers all "split domicile" cases that are not covered by the sec-
ond rule. It is worth noting that this rule contains an escape clause that apparently
requires a case-by-case interest analysis.
75 Korn, supra note 46, at 935 (quoting PatrickJ. Borchers, Conflicts Pragmatism, 56
ALB. L. REv. 883, 909 n.201 (1993); cf Barkanic II, 923 F.2d at 962 ("Essentially, the
Neumeier rules directed courts to apply the law of the place of the accident unless the
plaintiff and defendant were domiciliaries of the same state.").
76 See generally Symposium, Neumeier v. Kuehner, A Conflicts Conflict, 1 HoFSTRA L.
REv. 93 (1973); PatrickJ. Borchers, Conflicts Pragmatism, 56 Aus. L. REv. 883, 908-911
(1993); Korn, supra note 3, at 886-903; RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 238;
David E. Seidelson, Interest Analysis: The Quest for Perfection and the Frailties of Man, 19
DuQ. L. REv. 207, 214-20 (1981); GaryJ. Simson, The Neumeier- Schultz Rules: How
Logical A "Next Stage in the Evolution of the Law" After Babcock, 56 ALB. L. REv. 913
(1993). Some courts who considered adopting the Neumeier rules in their jurisdic-
tions had trouble with the escape clause built into the third rule and considered it as
a wild card, heavily frustrating the certainty and predictability goal. See, e.g., Labree
v. Major, 306 A.2d 808, 814-15 (R.I. 1973). Other courts were soon confronted with
fact situations not provided for by the Neumeier rules. See, e.g., Pahmer v. Hertz
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cial practice would prove that the rules were insufficiently
tailored to the complexity of the choice-of-law cases with
their unforeseeable number of different fact/issue
patterns."
For over a decade, the New York Court of Appeals would
leave the lower New York state courts and the federal courts
of the Second Circuit in total confusion as to the scope of
the Neumeier rules.78 In Rosenthal v. Warren"9 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted the Neumeier
rules as being limited to the question of foreign guest stat-
utes and refused to apply them to damage limitations in
wrongful death actions.8 '
When the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts had to interpret the New York choice-of-law rules in
the multidistrict air crash litigation arising out of the Air
Crash Disaster at Boston,8 l it did not even consider the
Corp., 296 N.E.2d 243 (N.Y. 1973) (Plaintiff and defendant were both New Yorkers,
but the car was registered in California, a guest statute state.).
11 Cf supra note 67 (discussing the confusing post-Babcock period characterized by
highly inconsistent decisions). See also Hay & Ellis, supra note 66, at 371 (remarking
that Babcock was factually a simple case providing an inadequate rule for more com-
plex cases).
78 This confusion was illustratively expressed by District Judge Tenney who felt
"called upon to wade into New York's choice-of-law quagmire." See O'Rourke v. East-
ern Air Lines, 730 F.2d 842, 847 (2d Cir. 1984); cf. Hay & Ellis, supra note 66, at 375-
76 nn.31-34 (remarking that "New York courts did not apply the Neumeier rules con-
sistently"). "Several courts simply ignored them. Instead they applied interest analy-
sis, a center of gravity or grouping of contacts approach .... or a more significant
contacts approach." Id. (citations omitted); for cases illustrating each approach, see
id. at 375-76 nn.31-33.
- 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973). Plaintiff's decedent, a
New York domiciliary, had traveled to Boston for an operation by a famous surgeon.
The patient did not survive the operation, and plaintiff brought a medical malprac-
tice action. The court granted unlimited recovery under New York law and refused
to apply the Massachusetts statutory limit on wrongful death actions. Id. at 440-46.
- Id. at 442 ("In no way, however, did the [New York] court [in Neumeier] retreat
from the position it had staked out in Kilberg and Miller, refusing to apply other
states' wrongful death limitations in the case of the death of a New York domicili-
ary.") (footnote omitted). It is worth noting that under the second Neumeier rule,
Massachusetts law, providing for limited recovery, would have applied.
81 In reAir Crash Disaster at Boston, Mass. on July 31, 1973, 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D.
Mass. 1975). The New York cases were transferred to the U.S. District Court of Mas-
sachusetts by the Multidistrict Litigation Panel under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 and pursuant
to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a). The plaintiffs sought damages in excess of $200,000
(U.S.), the Massachusetts limit on wrongful death damages. Id.
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Neumeier rules, holding that "under New York's choice-of-
law rules, the law applicable to the theory and amount of
damages recoverable for wrongful death [was] that of the
domiciles of the decedents and their beneficiaries." a2
Gordon v. Eastern Airlines3 and Junco v. Eastern Airlines4
seemed to confirm this view. 5
In Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc. 6 the New York Court
of Appeals added to the confusion stating in dictum, "It is
true that lex loci delicti remains the general rule in tort cases
to be displaced only in extraordinary circumstances. But it
has been acknowledged that in airplane crash cases, the
place of the wrong ... is most often fortuitous."17 Did this
statement mean that the lex loci delicti applied generally to
all tort conflict problems, including loss allocation outside
the guest statute context?88 What was to be understood as
82 Id. at 1122 (citing Thomas v. United Airlines, 249 N.E.2d 755, 759-60 (N.Y.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 991 (1969); Long v. Pan American World Airways, 213 N.E.2d
796 (N.Y. 1965); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 172 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1961)).
83 391 F. Supp 31, 33-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
399 F. Supp. 666, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
85 Both cases arose from the same air crash. The ill-fated flight originated in New
York, where all tickets were bought. The crash occurred in Florida, where the air-
line had its principal place of business. The Florida wrongful death statute-unlike
its New York counterpart-provided for damages for grief, mental anguish, and loss
of companionship. The court found Florida's contacts "adventitious" and "insignifi-
cant" and applied New York law, i.e., the law of the domicile. Gordon, 391 F. Supp. at
33. Note that under the third Neumeier rule, the normally applicable law would have
been the lex loc delicti, i.e., Florida law.
- 376 N.E.2d 914 (N.Y. 1978) (per curiam). Cousins was a products liability case
arising out of an air crash in Pennsylvania. The plane had been rented by a New
Yorker from a New Jersey corporation whose president resided in New York. The
plane had been manufactured in Florida by a Pennsylvania corporation. Under New
York law, contributory negligence barred recovery while under New Jersey and
Pennsylvania law, it did not. The court applied New York law because it was the
forum law and because significant events occurred in the forum. Id. at 915.
87 Cousins, 376 N.E.2d at 915.
8 See Himes v. Stalker, 416 N.Y.S.2d 986 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979). The court ex-
pressed uncertainty as to whether the Neumeier rules applied to tort conflicts other
than those involving guest statutes and eventually concluded that they did, stating
that "lex /oci delicti should apply generally to tort conflict problems, other than guest
statute situations." Id. at 993.
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"extraordinary circumstances" displacing the lex loci delicti? 9
Did airplane crashes fall within this exception?9"
In O'Rourke v. Eastern Airline?' the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit summarized an extensive analysis of
New York's choice-of-law system in a concise footnote that
expressly referred to Neumeier.92  The court found that
"[u] nder the system of interest analysis that New York
ha[d] evidently adopted,93 the law of the place of the wrong
normally applie[d] unless another state ha[d] a significant
interest in the application of its own law." 94 Because New
York's substantive law was not "an anachronistic law . . .
drastically limit[ing] or eliminat[ing] the damage award,"95
and because New York's law providing full and adequate
compensation did not give "an unjust or anomalous result,"
the court saw no reason to displace the lex loci delicti.96
Id. at 992 (acknowledging that "[w] hat the Court of Appeals will determine to
be 'extraordinary circumstances' is not clear").
9o See O'Rourke v. Eastern Airlines, 730 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1984) (expressing un-
certainty whether "all or even most airplane crash cases are within this exception");
cf. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 820 F. Supp. 503, 510
(C.D. Cal. 1992). Confronted with a contribution action arising out of an airplane
accident at Dallas International Airport due to a brake failure, the court applied the
interest analysis escape clause provided in the third Neumeier rule. Where MDC, the
manufacturer of the aircraft, was domiciled in Maryland and Missouri, and where
Goodyear, the company responsible for the brake/wheel assemblies, had its domi-
cile in Ohio, the court, referring to Cousins, decided to displace the lex loci delicti
because "American Airlines conducts numerous domestic and international flights,
and the fact that the accident occurred in Texas [was] merely fortuitous." Id. In-
stead, the court decided to apply the law of California, the state where the business
relationship between MDC and Goodyear had been centered for about twenty years
and where the subcontracts between both parties had been executed and per-
formed, which subcontracts contained choice-of-law provisions providing for the ap-
plication of California law. Id.
-- 730 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1984). O'Rourke involved an air crash in New York, kill-
ing, among others, a Greek citizen who was on his way home to Greece. New York's
wrongful death statute, unlike that of Greece, did not provide for recovery in wrong-
ful death actions for loss of consortium. The federal court applied what was for
plaintiff the less favorable New York law. Id. at 851.
Id. at 850 n.13.
9- Id. at 849 (referring to New York's sophisticated "interest analysis" approach
and citing Rosenthal Miller, and Tooker).
9 Id. at 850 n.13.
9- Id. at 850 (referring to Kilberg).
Id. (referring to Babcock).
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In sum, the foregoing cases reveal the confusion among
the lower New York state courts and the New York federal
courts as to the exact scope of the "Neumeier contrarevolu-
tion." More than a decade after Neumeier, the key question
remained whether the Neumeier rules applied to the wrong-
ful death action recovery issue.
E. SCzULTZ, THE ULTIMATE EXPANSION OF THE
"NEUMEZER CONTRAREVOLUTION" TO THE
WRONGFUL DEATH RECOVERY ISSUE
In Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. 7 the New York
Court of Appeals ultimately reaffirmed the validity and ap-
plicability of the Neumeier rules and expanded their cover-
age to all post-event tort loss distribution issues.9
Moreover, the court explicitly characterized a rule limiting
damages in wrongful death actions as a typical loss allocat-
ing rule, covered by Neumeier.9 Finally, the court added an
important fourth rule in the form of a public policy excep-
tion. 100 The court noted that it would refuse to apply for-
eign law as contrary to New York public policy if the party
invoking the exception proved that enforcing the foreign
law "would violate some fundamental principle of justice,
some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-
rooted tradition of the common weal" expressed in the
state's constitution, statutes and judicial decisions. 1'01 Fur-
97 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985). NewJersey domiciliaries brought suit against two
charitable organizations (one domiciled in NewJersey, the other in Ohio) for negli-
gently assigning an employee to a boy scout camp in New York. The employee sexu-
ally abused their children, and, as a result, one of the children committed suicide.
The question was whether NewJersey's charitable immunity doctrine barred recov-
ery. The court held that it did. Id. at 689.
98 Id. at 686 (stating that there is no "logical basis for distinguishing guest statutes
from other loss distributing rules. ").
99 Id. at 685. The reader will recall that Barkanic precisely involved a conflict be-
tween a rule limiting recovery and a rule providing for unlimited recovery.
10 Id. at 687-89; see also infra notes 245-57 and accompanying text (the public
policy exception applied to a Barkanio.type hypothetical).
10, Id. at 688 (quoting Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918))
(noting that the party invoking the exception has "a heavy burden for public policy
is not measured by individual notions of expediency and fairness or by a showing
that the foreign law is unreasonable or unwise").
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thermore, that party must establish "that there are enough
important contacts between the parties, the occurrence and
the New York forum to implicate [New York's] public policy
and thus preclude enforcement of the foreign law." 10 2
After Schultz, some New York state and federal courts ea-
gerly attempted a mechanical application of the seemingly
manageable "Neumeier-Schulti' rules to tort cases involving
conflicting loss allocation laws. 10 3 Others were rather reluc-
tant to adopt the rules and reached their decision under an
interest analysis approach.10 4 A good example is Scharfman
v. National Jewish Hospital and Research Center.10 5 The Appel-
late Division of the New York Supreme Court found under
an interest analysis that the plaintiff's New York domicile
and the defendant's screening of potential patients in a
New York office gave New York a significant interest in pro-
tecting its resident-patient by allowing the patient's recov-
ery under New York law. 10 6 It is worth noting that the court
would have reached the opposite result if it had applied the
second Neumeier-Schultz rule.' 0 7
102 Shultz, 480 N.E.2d at 688. While rejecting the public policy exception in
Schultz, the court explicitly referred to Kilbergas a case where "the contacts between
the New York forum, the parties and the transaction involved were substantial
enough to threaten [New York's] public policy." Id.
103 See Hay & Ellis, supra note 66, at 377 n.40.
104 Id. at 377 nn.41-45.
105 506 N.Y.S.2d 90 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). The plaintiff was a child domiciled in
New York who suffered permanent brain damage allegedly as a result of his treat-
ment with experimental drugs at the National Jewish Hospital and Research Center
located in Denver, Colorado.
106 Id. at 91. Under Colorado law, the "Captain of the Ship doctrine," that a hospi-
tal cannot be held liable for a physician's negligence, even if that physician is em-
ployed by the hospital, would have barred recovery. Note that the New York court
considered the Colorado law "unfair and anachronistic." Id. at 92.
107 See also Huang v. Lee, 734 F. Supp. 71, 75 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). Plaintiff's child
died of carbon monoxide intoxication while staying as an overnight guest in a house
in NewJersey. The court applied the less generous New York law in determining the
measure of damages in a wrongful death action brought by plaintiff against the New
Jersey owners of the house. Id. at 73. Applying an interest analysis, the court
thought the New York recovery standard appropriate to a New York resident and
acknowledged that it was "not New York's policy to enhance the recovery of its resi-
dents by the application of a more favorable foreign rule." Id. (quoting Gordon v.
Eastern Airlines, 391 F. Supp. 31, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). Note how the third Neumeier
rule would normally have pointed to New Jersey law.
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Still other courts applied the Neumeier-Schultz rules com-
bined with an interest analysis check" 8 Feldman v. Acapulco
Princess Hotel °9 is an excellent example of this third ap-
proach. In this case, the court found it instructive to check
the outcome it had reached under the second Neumeier-
Schultz rule by a subsequent examination of the allocation
of governmental interests.110 The court considered this
double check appropriate because the applicable rule had
never been previously applied on the given fact pattern.'
After having balanced the respective interests involved, the
court concluded that "the application of Mexican damages
law, mandated by application of the second [Neumeier] rule,
[was] entirely appropriate in [Feldman].""2
In sum, the Schultz decision gave guidance as to the exact
scope of the Neumeier rules, making them applicable to all
post-event tort loss distribution issues. Once again, how-
ever, the guidance seemed to leave room for confusion.
The lower New York state courts and the New York federal
courts clearly read different choice-of-law methods in the
Schultz decision. Some adhered to the mechanical applica-
tion of the Neumeier-Schultz rules; others reached their deci-
sion under a pure interest analysis; and a third group
applied a "rules/interest analysis" combination.
Moreover, the post-Schultz New York case law established
remarkable discrepancies in results. Some courts mysteri-
-0' The New York Court of Appeals seemed to approve and adopt this third ap-
proach in a recent case. See Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y.
1993); see also infra notes 235-37.
1- 520 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). The claim in Feldman arose from a swim-
ming pool accident in a Mexican hotel. The New York plaintiff sued the Mexican
owner of the hotel. New York law provided for unlimited recovery, while Mexican
law limited damages to "moral damages" and did not allow damages for pain and
suffering. The New York Supreme Court applied Mexican law under the second
Neumeier rule. Id. at 478.
110 See also Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Garrett Corp., 625 F. Supp. 752, 759
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). The court in Morgan interpreted the Schultz combined "rules-inter-
est analysis" approach, stating that the Schultz court "did not simply apply the first
Neumeier rule, but rather engaged in a full Babcock interest analysis." Id. The Morgan
court then applied the lex loci delicti under the third Neumeier rule and subsequently
checked the result of this application under an interest analysis. Id.
il See Feldman, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
112 Id. at 487.
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ously managed to apply the rules incorrectly,'13 while others
applied an interest analysis approach and achieved results
apparently inconsistent with the Neumeier-Schultz rules. 14
These discrepancies show that the rules were probably a
premature attempt to combine certainty, predictability, and
correct and fair interest-balanced results in a field charac-
terized by a factual diversity as complex as choice-of-law
cases involving conflicting loss-allocating laws." 5
It is against this confusing New York choice-of-law back-
ground that Barkanic II, the first air crash case since the
Neumeier-Schultz contrarevolution, was decided.1 1 6  Con-
fronted with the remarkable New York choice-of-law "rules/
approach" dichotomy, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit had to make its own choice between the pure
Neumeier-Schultz "rules"-oriented choice-of-law method, the
pure "interest analysis" approach, or the Feldman combina-
tion. The highest New York federal court would establish
its preference for the pure "rules"-oriented method." 7
III. BARKANIC, THE NEUMEIER-SCHULTZ MECHANIC
MECHANICALLY APPLIED
In mid-January 1985, Peter Barkanic and Donald Fox,
American businessmen and citizens of the District of Co-
lumbia and New Hampshire, respectively, arrived in China
113 See Hay & Ellis, supra note 66, at 377-78 n.40.
14 See, e.g., Huang, 734 F. Supp. 71; Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 625 F. Supp. 752;
Scharfman, 506 N.Y.S.2d 90. For more inconsistent cases, see Hay & Ellis, supra note
66, at 378-79 n.45.
"5 See Feldman, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 485 (admitting that the Neumeier rules were an
.early attempt at making sense of chaos," but nevertheless considering the rules, in
the light of fifteen years of further litigation, as "the best guide to a fair, reasonable,
consistent and constitutional determination of choice-of-law in tort cases").
1-6 923 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1991). See supra note 7.
117 Recently, the New York Court of Appeals, relying heavily on the Schultz deci-
sion, considered the "rules/interest analysis" combination the appropriate choice-of-
law method in a case covered by the second Neumeier rule, thus suggesting that
Barkanic misinterpreted the New York choice-of-law method as established by Schultz.
See Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 277; see also infra Part W.A. But see Mascarella v. Brown, 813
F. Supp. 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (recent case referring to and following Barkanic's
mechanical application of the second Neumeier rule). See also infra note 134 and
accompanying text.
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for the purpose of giving technical seminars in different
Chinese cities.118 Before leaving the United States, both
men had purchased several separate tickets for their trans-
portation to and from the United States and for their travel
exclusively within China."1 9
The tickets for the entirely domestic China Airlines flight
between Nanjing and Beijing were both purchased from a
Washington, D.C. agent for Pan American World Air-
ways.1 20 On January 18, these tickets, although issued in the
United States, were changed as to flight number and depar-
ture time121 by the Nanjing office of the General Adminis-
tration of Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of China
(CAAC) .122 The very same day, the ill-fated Flight 5109
crashed while attempting to land in poor weather atJinan,
China, killing Barkanic and Fox.
Representatives of their respective estates brought wrong-
ful death actions against CAAC in New York. The New York
contacts with the parties and the occurrence were rather
scarce. New York had been a stopping place in the Pan Am
flight bringing Mr. Barkanic from Washington, D.C. to
Hong Kong a few days before the fatal crash.' 23 Under the
1980 Civil Aeronautics Board permit, CAAC regularly
I 8 See supra note 8.
119 See supra note 9 (explaining how the tickets were written as separate transac-
tions and spelling out the respective itineraries).
120 Barkanic I, 822 F.2d at 12. The Civil Aviation Administration of the People's
Republic of China [hereinafter CAAC] and Pan American World Airways had an
interline traffic agreement and a general sales agency agreement whereby Pan Am
was to act as general sales agent for CAAC in the United States and CAAC was to act
as general sales agent for Pan Am in the People's Republic of China.
121 Under the CAAC-Pan Am interline sales agreement, tickets issued for domestic
flights in China bore the legend "RQY," which in airline ticketing practice means
that the domestic transaction had to be confirmed by CAAC in China. Barkanic I,
822 F.2d at 13.
- Until 1988, the CAAC, an agency of the Chinese government, exclusively pro-
vided domestic and international air services to passengers traveling to or from air-
ports within China. Since the 1988 deregulations, however, at least 35 different
airline companies have sprung up, resulting in an increased lack of sufficiently
trained pilots or basic facilities to handle the growth of the Chinese air transporta-
tion market. Lena H. Sun, Chinese Airliner Crashes, Killing All 160 Aboard: Country's
Worst Aviation Disaster Comes Amid Severe Criticism of Safety Record, WASH. POST, June 7,
1994, at A12.
123 See supra note 9.
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scheduled flight operations into and out of New York, made
its schedules available to the traveling public, and main-
tained its own employees and offices at two New York loca-
tions that were listed in public telephone directories. 124
Kilberg and its progeny, however, were certainly plaintiff-
attractive.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (FSIA). 125 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed that decision, based on the finding of a sig-
nificant nexus between CAAC's commercial activities in the
United States and the accident that occurred in China.12 6
On remand, the district court applied Chinese choice-of-
law rules, which required the application of Chinese law
and accordingly limited China Airlines' liability to $20,000
(U.S.). 127
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision. The court decided,
however, to apply the choice-of-law provisions of New York
state instead of the Chinese choice-of-law rules. 1 The
1 Barkanic I, 822 F.2d at 12.
125 29 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988). The FSIA transferred responsibility for foreign
sovereign immunity decisions from the State Department to the Judiciary. The Act
provides for a statutory system governing substantive issues of foreign state immu-
nity, as well as procedural issues. See generally GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTER-
NATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS, COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS
449 (2d ed. 1992).
- Barkanic I, 822 F.2d at 13-14. The court based its reversal on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605 (a) (2) (1988) ("A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States ... in any case ... in which the action is based upon a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state . . ").
12, The district court justified the application of the Chinese damage limitation
on the theory that the FSIA directs courts to apply the choice-of-law rules of the
place where the "act or omission" occurred, and that, under the facts of this case,
Chinese choice-of-law rules required the application of Chinese law. Barkanic II, 923
F.2d at 959.
128 Id. at 959-61 (holding that the FSIA implicitly requires courts to apply the
choice-of-law provisions of the forum state with respect to all issues governed by state
substantive law). The choice-of-law issue under the FSIA goes beyond the scope of
this note. For an excellent comment on Barkanic and choice-of-law under the FSIA,
see David E. Seidelson, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Whose Conflicts Law?
Whose Local Law? Barkanic v. General Administration of Civil Aviation of the People's Re-
CHOICE-OF-LAW METHOD
court determined that after Schultz, "New York courts would
... apply the Neumeier rules to all post-accident loss distribu-
tion rules, including rules that limit damages in wrongful
death cases."1 29 The court believed that the only factors the
New York high court "consider[ed] relevant with respect to
loss distribution issues [were] those factors incorporated in
the three Neumeier rules."13 0 The court further noted that,
unlike the third rule, the relevant portions of the second
Neumeier rule were phrased in non-discretionary terms,
which unambiguously called for application of the lex loci
delicti.131 Therefore, because CAAC's conduct occurred
within its "domicile" and the law of that domicile served to
limit CAAC's liability, the court applied the $20,000 dam-
age limitation under Chinese law.
Confronted with the remarkable New York choice-of-law
"rules/approach" dichotomy, the highest federal court sit-
ting in New York thus made its own choice among the pure
Neumeier-Schultz "rules"-oriented choice-of-law method, the
pure "interest analysis" approach, and the Feldman combi-
nation. 132 While referring to Feldman, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit apparently did not feel it appropri-
ate or necessary to follow Feldman's combined "rules/inter-
est" approach or "double check" choice-of-law analysis.' 33
Instead, the court chose the first method and limited itself
to a purely mechanical application of the second Neumeier-
public of China, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 427 (1992). See generally Desmond T. Barry, Solving
Choice of Law Problems in Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Cases, 55 DEF. CoUNS. J. 255
(1988); Sandra Engle, Choosing Law for Attributing Liability Under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: A Proposal for Uniformity, 15 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 1060 (1992); Andreas
F. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States-A Proposal for Reform of United States Law,
44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 901 (1969); Joel M. Overton, Will the Real FSIA Choice-of-Law Rule
Please Stand Up?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1591 (1992). For an interesting recent case
that followed the Barkanic reasoning that state rather than federal choice-of-law rules
should apply to federal actions based on the FSIA, see Pittston Co. v. Allianz Ins. Co.,
795 F. Supp. 678, 682 (D. N.J. 1992).
-2 Barkanic II, 923 F.2d at 963 (citing Feldman, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 483).
130 Id.
135 Id. at 962 n.5.
132 For a full description of the confusing New York choice-of-law "rules/ap-
proach" dichotomy after the Schultz decision, see supra Part II.E.
- See Feldman, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 485; see also supra notes 109-12 and accompanying
text.
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Schultz rule. Accordingly, the Second Circuit applied the
Chinese damage limitation.'
IV. BARKANIC, A JUSTIFIED APPLICATION OF
CHINESE LAW UNDER THE CURRENT NEW
YORK CHOICE-OF-LAW METHOD?
A. THE NEW YORK CHOICE-oF-LAw METHOD
MISINTERPRETED
To justify its application of Chinese law, Barkanic relied
heavily on Schultz and the extension under Schultz of the
controlling second Neumeier rule to all post-accident loss dis-
tribution issues, including rules limiting damages in wrong-
ful death actions. 35 The court believed that, under the
current New York choice-of-law method, the only relevant
factors to consider in a case involving conflicting loss distri-
bution rules were the factors incorporated in the three
Neumeier rules.' 36 Was the Second Circuit's belief justified?
Would the New York Court of Appeals, confronted with a
Barkanic-type case, really apply the second Neumeier-Schultz
rule in the same mechanical way?' 37 It would probably not.
It is worth noting that the Schultz fact pattern was not cov-
ered by the second Neumeier rule to begin with, and there
was no damage limitation rule involved in Schultz.138 In
134 Cf Mascarella v. Brown, 813 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). In this case, a
North Carolina plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against Dr. Brown, a New York
domiciliary, for failure to diagnose her mother's breast cancer. The court applied
the less generous New York law, which disallowed a cause of action for loss of society
and companionship, refused punitive damages, and considered taxes in the compu-
tation of damages. The court referred to Barkanic and mechanically applied the
second Neumeier rule, holding that "there is no reason to displace New York law,
especially since the second Neumeier rule is even more categorical than the third."
Id. at 1021.
135 Barkanic II, 923 F.2d at 962-63.
- See id. at 963 ("[T] he only factors the New York Court of Appeals now consid-
ers relevant with respect to loss distribution issues are those factors incorporated in
the three Neumeier rules.").
117 Under the second Neumeier rule fact pattern, this would mean that the court
would apply the lex loci delicti as soon as it finds a split domicile, the situs of the crash
in one of the litigant's domiciles, and the local law of each litigant's domicile favor-
ing them respectively.
138 The reader will recall that Schultz applied the first and third Neumeier rule to a
charitable immunity case. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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other words, Schultz's extension of the second Neumeier rule
to conflicting recovery rules in wrongful death actions was
pure dictum. Besides, at the moment Barkanic was decided,
the second Neumeier-Schultz rule had never been applied to
an air crash fact pattern, and certainly not in a case involv-
ing an air crash occurring outside the United States.13 9
Moreover, Barkanic was the first air crash case where several
jurisdictions, including a foreign developing country, were
particularly interested in the recovery issue, and where New
York operated as a "neutral" forum. 40 Finally, the line of
former pre- and post-Babcock New York air crash cases
seemed to suggest a different result. In a large majority of
these cases, the courts applied the law of the decedent's or
beneficiaries' domicile on the recovery issue arising from
an air crash. 1 '
139 By the time that Barkanic I was decided, the second Neumeier rule had been
discussed only once in the fact pattern of an actual case; see Feldman, 520 N.Y.S.2d at
477. Feldman involved an action by New York residents against Mexican residents for
personal injuries sustained while vacationing in Mexico. Mexican law limited dam-
ages, while New York law provided for unlimited recovery. The court applied the
Mexican damage limitation. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
140 There were no parties involved in Barkanic who were domiciled in New York;
neither did the crash occur in New York. The reader will recall that in all previously
discussed air crash cases requiring a New York choice-of-law decision, the crash oc-
curred in New York or one of the parties was domiciled in New York. See O'Rourke,
730 F.2d at 842 (the crash occurred in New York); Gore, 373 N.E.2d at 717 (the
passenger resided and was domiciled in New York at the time of the accident); Pear-
son, 309 F.2d at 533 (New York domiciliary was killed); In re Air Crash Disaster at
Boston, 399 F. Supp. at 1106 (the decedents and their beneficiaries were New York
domiciliaries); Junco, 399 F. Supp. at 666 (New York decedents and beneficiaries);
Gordon, 391 F. Supp. at 31 (New York decedent and beneficiaries); Ciprari, 245 F.
Supp. at 819 (New York decedent); Thomas, 249 N.E.2d at 755 (the deceased were
not domiciled but were employed in New York); Long, 213 N.E.2d at 796 (Pan Am
was incorporated in New York); and Kilberg, 172 N.E.2d at 526 (New York domicili-
ary was killed).
141 The reader will also recall that, of the previously discussed New York air crash
cases, only Ciprari and O'Rourke applied the lex loci delicti on the recovery issue. All
the other cases applied or suggested application of the law of the domicile or resi-
dence. See Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 627 (noting that in air crash cases, "whether
a court based its choice of law on public policy .... predominance of contacts or
center of gravity, the choice always resolved itself in favor of the law of the victim's
domicile or place of residence"). Even ORourke could easily be read as a rejection of
the lex loci delicti in case of "an anachronistic law . . .drastically limit[ing) or
eliminat[ing] the damage award." See O'Rourke, 730 F.2d at 850. Additionally,
Ciprari could arguably be distinguished from the Barkanic fact pattern inasmuch as
the tickets for the entirely domestic Brazilian ill-fated flight were purchased in Brazil
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It would, therefore, certainly have been instructive and
helpful if the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had
done an interest analysis check on its mechanically ob-
tained Neumeier-Schultz result in Barkanic II, and if it had at
least clarified the underlying reasons for what it considered
to be the just result.1 42 Instead, the court ingenuously hid
behind the Schultz dictum and added its own dictum stating
generally that "Kilberg and its progeny are no longer good
law."143
A 1993 New York Court of Appeals case confirms the
suggested "Feldman combination" analysis. 14 4 In an attempt
to clarify the current New York choice-of-law method, the
New York Court of Appeals found an interest analysis check
clearly appropriate in a second Neumeier-Schultz case.14 5
Cooney involved conflicting contribution rules that were
manifestly covered under the Schultz extension of the sec-
ond Neumeier rule. 146 Moreover, all relevant second rule
and not through a U.S. travel agent. Interestingly, this same fact also distinguishes
Ciprari from a California case involving California residents who were killed on a
domestic Mexican flight. The victims had purchased their tickets from the defend-
ant Mexican airline through a travel agency in California where the defendant air-
line was doing business extensively. The court refused to apply the lex loci delicti
(Mexico's damage limitation) because the defendant failed to show that Mexico's
interest in protecting its airline from large damage awards outweighed California's
interest in fully compensating its residents and in encouraging its residents' safety.
Hernandez v. Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A., 583 F. Supp. 331, 333 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
142 Cf Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1993) (applying the
first sentence of the second Neumeier-Schultz rule after having determined the appro-
priateness of the Neumeier-Schultz result under an interest analysis in a contribution
case). See also infra notes 145-49.
143 Barkanic II 923 F.2d at 961. Indeed, the court did not have to make this state-
ment because the Barkanic fact pattern (no New York parties involved, air crash oc-
curring in a foreign country, and on a purely domestic flight within that country)
was readily distinguishable from Kilberg and its progeny, which involved New York
residents, U.S. interstate air transportation, and a purely fortuitous crash location.
144 Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 277.
145 Id. Cooney dealt with a contribution action by a New York manufacturer of a
defective industrial machine against the Missouri employer of an injured worker.
The Missouri workers' compensation act precluded contribution actions against em-
ployers. New York law allowed such contribution actions.
- See id. at 282 (noting that "[c]ontribution rules-as involved in the present
case-are loss allocating, not conduct regulating").
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factors were present.147 Confronted, however, with a loss
allocation fact/issue pattern which differed from Schultz,
the Cooney court decided to check the Neumeier-Schultz result
under an interest analysis.1 4 Cooney's combined "rules/in-
terest analysis" method thus seriously places into question
the Second Circuit's mechanical application of the second
Neumeier-Schultz rule in Barkanic.
Therefore, in the light of New York's traditional favor for
the law of the domicile in earlier air crash cases and given
the exact opposite result reached in the fact-identical Her-
nandez case out of California, 149 it is worth now turning to
an a posteriori examination of the validity and usefulness of
the second Neumeier-Schultz rule in Barkanic, carefully con-
sidering and balancing the respective interests involved in
this case. If, in light of Cooney, the application of Chinese
law was justified under such an interest analysis, the second
Neumeier-Schultz rule has proven its validity and efficacy in a
Barkanic-type fact/issue pattern. If, however, an interest
analysis establishes an unjustified Neumeier-Schultz result, an
amendment of the second rule will have to be considered
in Barkanic-type cases.
B. BARKvizc UNDER AN INTEREST ANALYsis
An interest analysis approach seeks to effect the law of
the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in resolving
each particular issue involved. 50 An interest analysis ap-
proach, in other words, is designed to advance optimally
the various social goals implicated in a multi-state or inter-
1417 Id. at 283 (acknowledging that the case involved "a true conflict in the mold of
Neumeier's second rule, where the local law of each litigant's domicile favors that
party, and the action is pending in one of those jurisdictions"). "Under that rule,
the place of injury governs, which in this case means that contribution is barred."
Id.
148 Id. at 282 (noting that the loss allocation issue in this split domicile case de-
manded a "more complicated [analysis], calling upon [the court) to evaluate the
relative interests ofjurisdictions with conflicting laws . . .
149 See supra note 141.
1o See Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 683 (citing Babcock v.Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y.
1963)). See also Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 280 (citing Schultz and Miller v. Miller, 237
N.E.2d 877 (N.Y. 1968)).
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national conflict-of-laws problem. 151 To determine the
most interested state or the net maximum advancement of
all competing policies, a court must first determine the pol-
icies that the applicable laws seek to implement. Subse-
quently, the court must determine which state's policy will
be furthered by applying its law to the issue presented.1 52
Applying such an analysis to Barkanic, the second question
becomes key: which state's policy would be furthered by ap-
plying its law to the recovery issue? Let us first set out the
relevant contacts of the occurrence and the parties with
each jurisdiction involved.
Mr. Barkanic was domiciled in the District of Columbia
and left no dependent survivors domiciled in the District.
His mother, the dependent survivor and plaintiff in this
case, was a Maryland domiciliary. 15" Mr. Fox, on the other
hand, died domiciled in New Hampshire. He left a widow,
also domiciled in New Hampshire, who became the second
plaintiff in the Barkanic action.'5 4 New York was one of the
U.S. terminal points covered by the defendant's CAB per-
mit.155 China Airlines maintained offices and was listed in
public telephone directories in New York. The ill-fated
flight was a domestic flight from Nanjing to Beijing. The
tickets for the scheduled flight were bought from a Wash-
ington, D.C. agent for Pan American World Airways.156
These tickets were changed, however, by the CAAC office in
Nanjing, China, to the accident flight. The crash occurred
somewhere between Nanjing and Beijing. All jurisdictions
having potentially relevant contacts with the parties and the
15' See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 212.
15-2 The court must only consider factors which are significant, i.e., those relating
to the underlying policy or "purpose of the particular law in conflict." Miller, 237
N.E.2d at 879. See also Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394, 397 (N.Y. 1969) (citing
Babcock).
'5' See Seidelson, supra note 128, at 443-44 nn.66 & 71.
' Id. at 429 n.6, 443 n.66.
155 CAAC was authorized to operate in the United States by the Civil Aeronautics
Board in 1980. This authorization allowed CAAC to engage in scheduled foreign air
transportation to and from Honolulu, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York.
See Barkanic I, 822 F.2d at 12.
156 See supra note 120.
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occurrence provided for unlimited recovery, 157 except for
China which had a $20,000 (U.S.) limit.158
The underlying policies for unlimited recovery in an air
crash case can be based on several considerations.159 New
York's interests underlying its law of unlimited damages are
to maximize recovery for its domiciliaries, avoid the possi-
bility that its domiciliaries become public charges and/or
ensure that medical creditors in the state will be paid. 60
Assuming now that all U.S. jurisdictions involved have
adopted the forementioned underlying policies, the only
states effectively interested in having their law applied in
Barkanic, are those where the plaintiffs/beneficiaries of the
wrongful death action (i.e., the survivors) are domiciled or
reside.' 61 The only U.S. jurisdictions whose recovery policy
would be furthered by applying their law to the recovery
issue are New Hampshire, the state where Mr. Fox's widow
is domiciled, and Maryland, the domicile of Mr. Barkanic's
mother. 62
The underlying policy for China's limited recovery law,
on the other hand, is presumably the prevention of out-
157 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2701 (1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 556:12, 13, 14
(1974); MD Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-904 (1989); N.Y. Esr. PowERs &
TRUSTS LAw § 5-4.3 (McKinney 1981). This is based on the assumption that the
Warsaw Convention, as supplemented by the 1966 Montreal Agreement, was not
applicable to the Nanjing-Beijing leg. See supra note 11.
158 See Seidelson, supra note 128, at 428-29 n.4. In 1982 the Chinese government
amended its regulations to increase compensation for foreigners, overseas Chinese,
and Chinese of Hong Kong involved in domestic accidents. The maximum amount
of $20,000 (U.S.) dollars was established according to a preference treatment and
the Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention to which China had acceded. Citi-
zens of China would be paid an amount equivalent to $1,500 (U.S.).
1 The courts must discover these policies using the "ordinary processes of con-
struction and interpretation." RICHMAN & REYNoUS, supra note 14, at 212.
1- See Feldman, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
16, Cf. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Garrett Corp., 625 F. Supp. 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
Where the issue is loss allocation, "the significant contacts are, almost exclusively,
the parties' domiciles and the locus of the tort." Id. at 758 (citing Schultz, 491
N.Y.S.2d at 95). See also Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 280 (acknowledging that "if competing
'postevent remedial rules' are at stake other factors [than the locus delicti] are taken
into consideration, chiefly the parties' domiciles").
162 In most cases the plaintiffs' or survivors' domicile will be the same as the de-
ceased's domicile, which will also be the place where the estate is probated. In
Barkanic, however, the only dependent survivor, Mr. Barkanic's mother, lived in a
different state.
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flows of capital and resources indispensable to the develop-
ment of its infant airline industry.1 63  Protection of an
airline industry is of extraordinary public and national
importance. 64
In sum, New Hampshire's and Maryland's policies, fur-
thered by unlimited recovery, would be advanced by respec-
tively applying New Hampshire law to Mr. Fox's widow's
wrongful death action and Maryland law to Mr. Barkanic's
mother's wrongful death action. Doing so, however, would
in either action thwart China's policy of protecting its in-
fant airline industry from depletion of indispensable capital
and resources. 65 The relation between the laws, policies,
and contacts with each state involved in the Barkanic action
can be diagrammed as follows: 166
165 See George B. Reese, Conflict of Laws, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 213, 235-36 (1992)
(noting that CAAC might find a New York size damage award "economically difficult
or impossible to satisfy with obvious international political repercussions"). How-
ever, this ignores the mandatory insurance CAAC is required by the Department of
Transportation to maintain on all of its flights to and from the United States. See 14
CFR § 205.5.
16 Cf Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468,
471 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966). One purpose of the Brazilian
damage limitation in wrongful death actions against Brazil's airline was to protect an
industry whose success "is a matter not only of pride and commercial well-being, but
perhaps even of national security." Id.
165 It is worth noting, however, that to the extent the risk to pay large hard cur-
rency damage awards is actually shifted to a third, non-Chinese party (e.g., foreign
insurance companies), China's interest in having its law applied would be largely
neutralized. China's remaining interest would then be limited to avoiding the pay-
ment of a deductible and to avoiding an increase of insurance premiums. Thus,
depending upon the importance of deductible and premium increase, the conflict-
ing interests in Barkanic could arguably be accommodated through an insurance
mechanism. The "true conflict" would then be transformed into a "false conflict"
requiring application of Maryland and New Hampshire unlimited recovery law.
More information with regard to CAAC's insurance coverage would be necessary to
develop this interesting argument. See also infra note 213.
6 See generally William M. Richman, Diagramming Conflicts: A Graphic Understand-
ing of Interest Analysis, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 317 (1982).
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1. The Barkanic Wrongful Death Action
New York Maryland China
contacts - forum - domicile of the deceased's - the crash
- CAAC does deceased mother - airline's main
business - ticket purchased domiciled place of business
- CAAC does - ticket changed
business through
Pan AM
law unlimited recovery unlimited recovery unlimited recovery i limited recovery($20,000)
policies - full compensation - full compensation -- full compensation - protect airline
for domiciliaries for domiciliaries for domiciliaries industry against
depletion of
- prevent -prevent - prevent indispensable
domiciliaries from domiciliaries from domiciliaries from capital and
becoming public becoming public becoming public resources
wards wards wards
- protect medical - protect medical -protect medical
creditors creditors creditors
the Cooney interest analysis/
choice of law "rules/interest Second lex loci delicti
t69  fez foci deficti 7 0
(rule-approach) analysis approach" Sestntila
combination 67  RestatementI68
The preceding diagram first shows that the only states in-
terested in having their law applied to the recovery issue at
stake are Maryland and China. These are, indeed, the only
states having the necessary connecting factor - the domi-
cile of a party - between the application of their respective
laws and the furtherance of their underlying policies.
1 7 1
Even more importantly, however, the diagram points out
the "true conflict" between the interested states' laws. The
underlying policy of each state points to a connecting factor
in that state, which means. that each state's policy would be
167 See Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 277.
'6 See Borchers, supra note 37, at 371.
16 Where a wrongful death occurs in another state, the Maryland courts apply the
law of such other state as though such foreign law were the law of Maryland. See
Wilson v. Fraser, 353 F. Supp. I (D. Md. 1973); Debbis v. Hertz Corp., 269 F. Supp.
671 (D. Md. 1967); Kaufmann v. Service Trucking Co., 139 F. Supp. 1 (D. Md.
1956).
170 See General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, 34 Am. J. CoM-
PAR. L. 715, 742 (Whitmore Gray & Henry R. Zheng, trans., 1986).
1 Washington, D.C. is not to be considered as an interested state because there
are no domiciliaries/beneficiaries of the wrongful death action located there.
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advanced if its law were applied to the recovery issue
presented.
It is worth noting, though, that Maryland adheres to the
traditional lex loci delicti choice-of-law rule. 172  Moreover,
the Maryland courts seem to have no problem imposing the
recovery ceiling provided for by a wrongful death statute of
the state in which the tort occurred. 173 One could thus con-
clude that "if the Barkanic action had been brought before a
Maryland court, that court presumably would have imposed
the Chinese ceiling even to the economic jeopardy of the
Maryland dependent survivor. ' 174  This conclusion, how-
ever, does not automatically allow the suggestion that in
Barkanic Maryland had no interest in having its law applied,
or that China had the more significant interest in imposing
its ceiling on recovery.' 75 Maryland's traditional choice-of-
law rule and its pure jurisdiction-selecting result is, indeed,
an irrelevant consideration under an interest analysis, sim-
ply because the rule and its result are not based on an inter-
est analysis premise. 176 The attempt to transform a "true
conflict" 177 into a "false conflict,"178 by considering Mary-
land's traditional lex loci delicti rule and its presumable re-
172 See supra note 169; see also Borchers, supra note 37, at 371.
171 See Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Servs., 326 F. Supp. 709 (D. Md. 1971).
(holding that the mere absence of a monetary limitation upon recovery under the
Maryland wrongful death act does not of itself reflect such a strong Maryland public
policy as to prevent enforcement of the Minnesota wrongful death statute's mone-
tary limitation) (quoted in Polglase v. Greyhound Lines, 401 F. Supp. 335 (D. Md.
1975); cited in Connor v. Hauch, 437 A.2d 661 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981)), aff'd, 453
A.2d 1207 (Md. 1983); see also Walker v. Essex, 569 A.2d 645 (Md. 1990).
14 See Seidelson, supra note 128, at 445.
175 But see Seidelson, supra note 128, at 445 (suggesting that Maryland's retention
of lex loci delicti implies a more significant interest for China in imposing its ceiling).
176 The New York Neumeier-Schultz rules could arguably be considered in an inter-
est analysis to determine New York's interest. As these rules have been induced
from interest analysis cases, they are a relevant parameter to measure New York's
interest in loss allocation issues.
177 A "true conflict" exists if the policy of more than one state would be furthered
by applying its law to the issue presented. RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at
212-13.
178 A "false conflict" exists if the policy of only one state would be furthered by
applying its law to the issue presented. A false conflict is considered the easy case
and must be resolved by applying the law of the only interested state. Id.
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sult, is thus not persuasive. The Barkanic action, therefore,
presents a real "true conflict."
The next diagram similarly shows that the only states in-
terested in having their law applied to the recovery issue at
stake in the Fox wrongful death action are New Hampshire
and China.
2. The Fox Wrongful Death Action
New York D.C. New Hampshire China
contacts - forum - ticket purchased deceased's wife - the crash
- CAAC does - CAAC does domiciled - airline's main
business business through -deceased 
place of business
Pan AM domiciled - tickets changed
limited recovery
law unlimited recovery unlimited recovery unlimited recovery r0o000 e
policies - full compensation - full compensation - full compensation - protect airline
for domiciliaries for domiciliaries for domiciliaries industry against
depletion of
- prevent -prevent - prevent indispensable
domiciliaries from domiciliaries from domiciliaries from capital and
becoming public becoming public becoming public resources
wards wards wards
- protect medical - protect medical - protect medical
creditors creditors creditors
the Cooney interest analysisl Leflar's choice-
choice of law "rules/interest Second influencing lex loci delicti
(rule-approach) analysis approach" Restatement c i o 1 7 9
combination
In sum, the previous diagrams clearly reveal the "false
conflict" between Chinese law and New York law and be-
tween Chinese law and D.C. law. Indeed, the respective dia-
grams reveal no significant New York or D.C. contacts with
the recovery issue. In other words, all of the New York and
D.C. contacts are unrelated to the underlying policies or
recovery purposes of the conflicting laws. Conversely, the
diagrams point out the "true conflict" between the Mary-
'7 See Borchers, supra note 37, at 372.
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land and New Hampshire full recovery laws and the Chi-
nese limited recovery rule.1 80
C. CONSTITUTIONALITY ANALYSIS
Thus confronted with a "true conflict""8 ' involving a
"state international extraterritoriality" issue, 82 the choice of
law must be consistent with the U.S. Constitution, 1 3 in par-
ticular, with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.184
The current test for due process limitations on state
choice-of-law was set in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague.8
Under Hague, a "State must have a significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests,
such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor funda-
mentally unfair."' 86 In short, a choice of law will be consti-
tutionally permissible if that choice does not result in
180 The resolution of a "true conflict" is considered the most difficult issue in in-
terest analysis. See RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 278 (quoting Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)).
18, Note that the Constitution and the constitutionality test is implicated only by a
"true conflict." A "false conflict" does not require a choice; the application of the
law of the sole interested state automatically satisfies the constitutionality test. See
RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 278 (quoting ShutLs, 472 U.S. 797).
182 Issues of "state international extraterritoriality" or "state international choice-
of-law" arise if the facts of a case cross national borders. See Lea Brilmayer & Charles
Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifh Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REv.
1217, 1224 (1992).
183 Id. at 1219 (noting that constitutional consistency is required "even when the
case exhibits international and not purely interstate elements") (citing Home Ins.
Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1930)).
184 U.S. CONsT. amend XIV, § I ("No State shall... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ." The clause prohibits the
application of law that is only casually or slightly related to the litigation. See Shutts,
472 U.S. at 819).
- 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (plurality opinion). Plaintiff's husband was killed in a
motorcycle accident in Wisconsin. Both drivers were Wisconsin residents, and all of
the vehicles were registered in Wisconsin. After the accident, plaintiff moved to
Minnesota and brought suit there. Wisconsin law limited recovery to the coverage
provided in one insurance policy, while Minnesota law permitted "stacking" (com-
bining) of three policies. The Supreme Court upheld the application of Minnesota
law.
1 8 Id. at 312-13.
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"unfair surprise. ' u 17 Under this test, the Supreme Court up-
held the application of Minnesota law in Hague because the
plaintiff (widow) resided in Minnesota at the time the suit
was brought, the defendant was doing business in Minne-
sota, and the deceased had been a member of the Minne-
sota work force.1 88
It is significant that the plaintiff's domicile was the only
connection with Minnesota that was related to the recovery
issue at stake and that gave this state a real interest in apply-
ing its law to the issue." 9 Justice Brennan noted, however,
that the post-event resident connection, standing alone, was
not sufficient to confer legislative jurisdiction on
Minnesota.1 90
Hague did not express any view as to whether the defend-
ant's doing business in a state would, standing alone, sup-
port the application of that state's law to unrelated issues. 91
Four years later, however, the Supreme Court suggested
that this factor in and of itself would not suffice. 19 2 On the
other hand, the Supreme Court subsequently held that a
historically recognized ground for legislative jurisdiction or
choice of law, such as the forum state's application of its
own statute of limitations, was constitutionally adequate. 9 3
"s7 See generally RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
520-21 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing the unfair surprise argument).
1 Hague, 449 U.S. at 313-20.
- Id. at 319 (arguing that the post-accident move gave Minnesota an interest in
fully compensating its "resident accident victims," keeping them "off welfare rolls"
and enabling them "to meet financial obligations").
- Id. (holding that "a post-occurrence change of residence ... was insufficient in
and of itself to confer power on the forum State to choose its law") (citing John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936)).
191 Hague, 449 U.S. at 320 n.29 ("We express no view whether the first two con-
tacts, either together or separately, would have sufficed to sustain the choice of Min-
nesota law. . . ."). Decedent was a member of Minnesota's work force; defendant
did business in Minnesota.
- See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 819-23 (1985) (invalidating
the application of Kansas law by the Kansas state court to a class action against Phil-
lips by lessors of gaslands in 11 states for interest allegedly due on royalty payments).
Although fewer than three percent of the plaintiffs and one percent of the leases
had any apparent connection with the state of Kansas, the Kansas courts had applied
Kansas law to every claim.
19- See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 725-30 (1988). Sun Oil involved the
same Shutts gas royalties issue. This time the Kansas state court found a false conflict
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The question now is whether, in Barkanic, the application
of Maryland or New Hampshire law, both providing for un-
limited recovery, would have satisfied the Hague "contacts-
interests-fairness" constitutionality test. Plaintiffs were dom-
iciled in Maryland and New Hampshire, respectively, and
both states presumably had an interest in maximizing their
residents' recovery and keeping them off welfare rolls. 194
Thus, both states had "significant contacts... creating state
interests," thus satisfying the first and second prongs of the
Hague constitutionality test. 19 5 But, do these contacts suf-
fice to make the choice of Maryland or New Hampshire law
"neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair"?196
With Justice Brennan's remark in Hague in mind,197 it
could be argued that the domicile connection in itself
would not have satisfied fundamental fairness in holding
CAAC to Maryland and New Hampshire legislative stan-
dards. The domicile of Mr. Barkanic's mother and Mr.
Fox's widow was, indeed, the only significant contact link-
ing each jurisdiction to the controversy.1 98 This link, how-
ever, was completely unrelated to China Airlines, which was
not even doing business in those states. China Airlines
could not reasonably have expected to be judged under
New Hampshire or Maryland legislative standards for an air
because the liability rules and interest rates were substantially the same in all in-
volved states. The finding of a false conflict implied lack of injury and avoided the
constitutional issue. The Kansas high court had further reasoned that the limita-
tions issue was a procedural question governed by Kansas law. The U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed the application of Kansas law.
194 Cf Hague, 449 U.S. at 319 (in which plaintiff (widow) resided in Minnesota at
the time the suit was brought).
'g' See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
9 This is the "fairness" prong of the Hague constitutionality test. See Hague, 449
U.S. at 312-13; see also Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 182 at 1243 ("Contacts and
interests in themselves do not demonstrate the fundamental fairness of holding a
defendant to legislative standards.").
,97 See supra note 190 and accompanying text (a post-occurrence change of resi-
dence is insufficient in and of itself to confer legislative jurisdiction).
198 Presumably, unlike in Hague, the plaintiffs did not move after the crash and
prior to the litigation. The forum-shopping concern expressed in Shutts is therefore
irrelevant in this case. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 820. Nothing in these Supreme Court




crash in China of a purely domestic flight. 199 Nor would
the domicile connection be constitutionally adequate
under the Sun Oil analysis.20° Indeed, domicile is not a
traditional basis for legislative jurisdiction. 20 1
In sum, China Airlines would arguably be unfairly sur-
prised to be held either to Maryland's or New Hampshire's
unlimited recovery standards. Applying these states' laws
would, therefore, violate the due process requirement of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
D. INTEREST ANALYSIS AND A BARKANIC-TYPE
HYPOTHETICAL
2 °2
But what if the plaintiffs had been New York domiciliar-
ies? Unlike Maryland and New Hampshire, New York had
no significant contacts with the recovery issue presented in
Barkani.23 Under a pure interest analysis, the Second Cir-
cuit would thus have detected a "false conflict" and would
have decided, as it did under the Neumeier-Schultz rules, not
to apply New York law.
The key question then becomes whether the New York
courts would apply New York law in a Barkanic-type case if
the plaintiffs are New Yorkers.2 0 4 Barkanic applies the sec-
ond Neumeier-Schultz rule and generally states that Rosenthal
and Kilberg, both cases involving New York domiciliaries
"are no longer good law." 2 5 Is Barkanic really suggesting
that "the plaintiff's domicile should now be given no
I" See Reese, supra note 163, at 235-36 (finding it "insensitive, if not foolhardy, to
impose United States law on foreigners operating at home").
See supra note 193.
201 See Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 182, at 1242.
Assuming that the Maryland and New Hampshire domicile connection in and
of itself satisfies the constitutionality test, the interest analysis infra Part IV.D. also
applies to Barkanic.
203 See supra notes 140-80.
- See Reese, supra note 163, at 236-37 ("[T]he question immediately comes to
mind: what if plaintiffs had been New Yorkers?").
205 Barkanic II, 923 F.2d at 961.
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weight in a choice of law analysis so long as the tort oc-
cur[s] away from that place"?20 6
Let us examine this suggestion under the current New
York choice-of-law method and assume, contrary to fact,
that the plaintiffs in Barkanic were New York domiciliaries.
New York, domicile of the plaintiffs, co-terminal point, stop-
ping place in the international flight that brought Mr.
Barkanic to China, and place where CAAC is engaged in
substantial business, would probably have the constitution-
ally required nexus with this hypothetical Barkanic litigation
to make the choice of its own law constitutionally
permissible. °7
After determination of New York's sufficient interest in
the litigation to satisfy the constitutional threshold, the New
York court must decide whether the interests of the jurisdic-
tions having conflicting laws "can be accommodated with-
out substantially impairing [each] other. ' 20  Thus, China's
interest in limiting damages to secure the indispensable
capital and resources for its infant airline industry must be
balanced against New York's interest in securing proper
and just compensation for its residents. 9
2-6 See Reese, supra note 163, at 237 (doubting that this is a correct conclusion
under New York choice-of-law analysis); see also infra note 243.
-7 See supra Part IV.C (analysis of the Hague constitutionality test); cf. Cooney, 612
N.E.2d at 279-80 (holding that New York's contacts, in the aggregate, were sufficient
to satisfy the constitutional threshold where the defendant was present and did busi-
ness in New York, where the plaintiff was a New York domiciliary, and where the
machine causing the damage was ordered in New York and eventually shipped out
of that state).
0 Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 282.
Cf Ciprari v. Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro, 245 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) aff'd;
359 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1966). In Ciprari, a New York resident was killed on a domestic
Brazilian flight. He bought his ticket in Rio de Janeiro. The Brazilian airline con-
ducted only very limited and unrelated business in New York. The court applied the
Brazilian damage limitation because Brazil had an interest in "the financial integrity
of her local airlines" and "the only relationship or contact of New York [was] the fact
that plaintiff [was] a resident of New York." Id. at 824-25. But see Hernandez v.
Aeronaves de Mexico, 583 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (involving California resi-
dents killed on a domestic Mexican flight). Decedents had purchased their tickets
from defendant airline in California where the defendant was extensively doing
business. The court refused to apply Mexico's damage limitation because the de-
fendant failed to show that Mexico's interest in protecting its airline from large dam-
800
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China indisputably has an interest in protecting its airline
industry from potentially large damage awards. Such
awards could, indeed, generally affect a developing nation's
economic strength,21 ° particularly damaging its politically21'
and economically212 important airline industry.213 Further-
more, China's damage limitation on wrongful death ac-
tions arising from air crashes was enacted in regulations of
1951 and renewed and amended as recently as 1982.214
These regulations were doubtlessly enacted and renewed
"with a view toward protecting what was [in 1951] and still
is,215 an infant industry of extraordinary public and national
age awards outweighed California's interest in fully compensating its residents and
in encouraging their safety. Id. at 333.
210 See Ciprari, 245 F. Supp. at 824 (citing Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa, 350 F.2d
468 (D.C. Cir. 1965); cf Hernandez, 583 F. Supp. at 333.
211 Cf Tramontana, 350 F.2d at 471 (finding that one purpose of Brazil's damage
limitation was to protect an industry whose success "is a matter not only of pride and
commercial well-being, but perhaps even of national security").
212 Id. at 471 n.8 ("Air transportation has become increasingly important in Brazil,
both because of the size of the country, and because of the relative inadequacy of
surface transportation.").
213 See Reese, supra note 163, at 235-36 (noting that CAAC might find a New York
size damage award "economically difficult or impossible to satisfy with obvious inter-
national political repercussions"). The reader may recall, however, the argument
that to the extent the risk of paying large hard currency damage awards can actually
be shifted to a third, non-Chinese party (e.g., foreign insurance companies), China's
interest in having its law applied would be greatly reduced, if not neutralized. See
supra note 165.
214 See Seidelson, supra note 128. An interesting point to consider is that the citi-
zens of China would equally recover up to $20,000 (U.S.) (under Warsaw-Hague) or
$75,000 (U.S.) (under Warsaw-Montreal) in case of a Warsaw Convention accident.
See LoWENFELD, supra note 29, 7-110 (stating that "if a flight were subject to the
Warsaw Convention rules, a passenger would be protected against a limit less than
that stated in the Convention, whether or not the state where the accident occurred
was a party to the Convention").
215 See Lynne Curry, Survey of Asian Aerospace: Breakneck Growth May Slow As Attention
Turns to Safety-China's Aviation Industiy, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 18, 1994 at 211 (not-
ing that "[m]arred by a series of crashes in the last year, the breakneck growth of
China's aviation industry is likely to slow as the country seeks to reverse its image as
one of the most dangerous places in the world to fly"); see also Sun, supra note 122
(reporting the crash of a Chinese airliner 10 minutes after takeoff from the central
Chinese tourist city of Xian, killing all 160 aboard, including two Americans). The
article further states, "China, which has the world's fastest growing aviation market,
has been struggling in recent years to improve its [poor] safety record.... and has
asked for help from the West, particularly from the U.S. National Transportation
Safety Board and the Federal Aviation Administration." Id.
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importance" for a developing country. 16 Finally, China's
limitation seemingly only applies to airplane accidents not
subject to the Warsaw Convention.217 It is, in other words,
not an across-the-board ceiling on recovery for wrongful
death, clearly demonstrating the focus of China's
concern.
2 18
But does not New York have an equivalent essential inter-
est in its residents' full recovery for their actual pecuniary
loss?219 And does not the fact that the New York State Con-
stitution prohibits any statutory limitation of wrongful
death action damages equally demonstrate the focus of
New York's concern? 220
Manifestly, the interests of China and New York are irrec-
oncilable in this case. To the extent the court allows unlim-
ited recovery against CAAC, the policy underlying China's
1951-1982 regulations will be offended. Conversely, to the
extent the New York plaintiffs receive less than their actual
loss, the policy underlying New York's wrongful death stat-
ute providing for unlimited recovery is offended. It is obvi-
216 Cf. Tramontana, 350 F.2d at 471.
27 Chinese tort law generally provides for unlimited recovery. "Where personal
injury is caused to a citizen, compensation must be paid for medical expenses, loss
of income from work, expense of living as a disabled person, and similar expenses;
when death is caused, there must also be payment for funeral expenses, as well as
expenses such as necessary maintenance for the deceased's dependents." General
Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, 34 AM.J. COMPAR. L. 715, 737-38
(Whitmore Gray & Henry P. Zheng, trans., 1986); accord Robert Force & Xia Chen,
An Introduction to Personal Injury and Death Claims in the People's Republic of China, 15
TUL. MAR. L.J. 245, 276-279 (1991) (describing a case where the tortfeasor was re-
quired to compensate all of the decedent's lost income until retirement and 90%
thereafter, reduced only by the amount the decedent would have spent for his or
her needs).
218 Cf Tramontana, 350 F.2d at 471-72 (reading a similar specificity in Brazilian law
as an enhanced interest for Brazil in having its ceiling applied).
219 SeeJohn B. Austin, A General Framework for Analyzing Choice-ofLaw Problems in Air
Crash Litigation, 58J. AIR L. & COM. 909, 963 n.132 (1993) (stating that the plaintiff
state's interest in its residents' recovery for actual pecuniary loss is a common one
shared by all states in regard to their domiciliaries: to ensure that plaintiffs receive
proper relief for pecuniary loss and avoid becoming wards of the state); see also Lee
S. Kreindler, A Plaintiff's View of Montrea 33J. AIR L. & COM. 528, 530 (1967) (not-
ing that it is "absolutely basic and fundamental to American citizens that an injured
person should be appropriately compensated for the loss he has sustained").
22 See N.Y. CONST. art. I § 16 ("[T]he amount recoverable shall not be subject to
any statutory limitation.").
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ous that China's interest cannot be accommodated without
sacrificing New York's interest and vice versa.221 The "com-
parative impairment"-type analysis,222 suggested by the New
York Court of Appeals as a first resort to resolve the appar-
ent impasse of a second Neumeier-Schultz rule case, 223 is not
helpful in our hypothetical Barkanic fact pattern. The im-
pairment of New York's policy seems to be the exact flip
side of the impairment of China's policy. Indeed, if the
court decides to apply Chinese law, the extent to which
New York's full recovery policy is impaired is precisely pro-
portionate to the effectuation of the Chinese limited dam-
ages policy. In the reverse situation, the advancement of
the New York policy would be exactly proportionate to the
extent of impairment of the Chinese policy.
Several choice-of-law theories suggest different solutions
for resolving the impasse. Under the pure interest analysis
approach, the forum should apply its own law in any true
conflict case. 24 If the forum is disinterested, an unavoida-
ble conflict exists between the interests of two other states,
and the court cannot justifiably decline to adjudicate the
2 Cf Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 283 (finding it impossible to accommodate Missouri's
and New York's competing interests in the given contribution case).
- The "comparative impairment" approach was originally developed by Profes-
sor William Baxter and subsequently adopted by California as a variation of interest
analysis specifically designed to resolve true conflicts. Starting from the premise that
all state interests are entitled to equal weight and willing to effectuate the greatest
overall promotion of states' policies, this approach tries to solve the impasse by com-
paring the extent of impairment of each state policy and applying the law of the
state whose policy would be most impaired were it not applied. See William F. Bax-
ter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. Rav. 1 (1963); see also Bernhard v.
Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723 (Cal.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
22 See Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 281-82. After stating that "the interest of each State in
enforcement of its law is roughly equal," the court suggests evaluating "the relative
interests of the jurisdictions with competing laws" to see whether either law can be
applied "without substantially impairing the other." Id. The court appears to use
the "comparative impairment" approach, not to solve a "true conflict" but to detect
"a false conflict," where the claim for application of one of the conflicting rules is so
slender that the conflict is easily resolved in favor of the other rule. The court does
not provide any guidance, however, as to when an impairment of interest is "substan-
tial" and, therefore, at what point false conflict turns into true conflict, and vice
versa.
224 See Wius L.M. REESE ET AL., CONFLiCr OF LAws: CASES AND MATERIALS 488 (9th
ed. 1990).
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case, it should apply the law of the forum equally.2 25 Under
a pure interest analysis, the New York courts would thus
grant unlimited recovery in both the real Barkanic fact situa-
tion226 and in the hypothetical fact pattern.227 The New
York Court of Appeals has clearly distanced itself, however,
from this solution, expressing in Cooney a distaste for bias in
favor of the forum's law.228
Another way to resolve the impasse could be an attempt
to determine the "better law. ' 229 But could the court hon-
estly pretend that the consideration of a law, though "ab-
surd and unjust" in the light of current U.S. socio-economic
jurisprudential standards,230 is equally "archaic, absurd and
unjust" under international standards? Indeed, limitation
of liability is still the rule in international aviation acci-
dents, 23 1 and the "infant industry-protecting" purpose of
225 Id.
226 In Barkanic, New York was an uninterested forum for pure interest analysis
purposes, and the court would therefore have applied the forum law, which corre-
sponded with New Hampshire's, Maryland's, or the District of Columbia's unlimited
recovery law.
-7 In the hypothetical case, New York is an interested forum because the plaintiffs
are domiciled there. The hypothetical further assumes that the New York contacts
in the aggregate are sufficient to satisfy the constitutional threshold. See supra text
accompanying note 186.
228 Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 281-82 (preferring a neutral tie breaker, "rebutting an
inference that the forum State is merely protecting its own domiciliary or favoring its
own law"); see also Feldman, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 483 n.12 (noting that "New York,
although employing the language of governmental interest analysis, has distanced
itself from Professor Currie's view that the forum should apply its own law in any
true conflicts case").
The "better law" approach has been developed by Professor Robert A. Leflar.
Professor Leflar believes a law is better if it is "superior" to another law when judged
under current "socio-economicjurisprudential standards." ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMER-
ICAN CONFLICtS LAw 297 (4th ed. 1986).
230 Today, general limitations on amounts recoverable for pecuniary losses in
wrongful death actions have been repealed by all U.S. states. See Lowenfeld, supra
note 1, at 174 n.82 (noting that by 1988, none of the 50 states still limited damages
recoverable for pecuniary loss under wrongful death statutes; in 1966, 17 states had
statutory wrongful death limits for pecuniary loss); see also supra note 20.
231 International air travel has traditionally been governed by the Warsaw system
consisting of the Warsaw Convention (imposing a $8,300 (U.S.) damage limitation),
the Hague Protocol (imposing a $16,600 (U.S.) damage limitation), and the Mon-
treal Agreement (imposing a $75,000 (U.S.) damage limitation). Kimberlee S.
Cagle, The Role of Choice of Law in Determining Damages for International Aviation Acci-
dents, 51 J. AIR L. & CoM. 953, 954 (1986).
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that rule is probably still socio-economically justified when
airlines of developing countries are involved.232
Still another solution was suggested in In re Air Crash Dis-
aster Near Chicago,2 3 where the Court of Appeals of the Sev-
enth Circuit broke the "tie," balancing the policies of a
third jurisdiction interested in having its law applied to the
recovery issue. If the New York court adopted this solution,
it would grant unlimited recovery in both the real Barkanic
fact situation and our hypothetical fact pattern. Indeed, in
either situation, there are more interested states providing
for unlimited recovery than states having a limited recovery
rule. Finally, the court could weigh the relative importance
of the conflicting policies involved to break the impasse.
To weigh the conflicting policies involved in Barkanic, Pro-
fessor Seidelson suggests giving a high priority to China's
national security interest, which implicates "the protection
and preservation of human life-as many as one billion
lives."23 4
In Cooney, the New York Court of Appeals made it clear,
however, that it considered the locus delicti to be the appro-
priate "tie breaker" in a case where the interested states
were determined to have substantially equal interests.23 5
For the first time, the New York Court of Appeals gave its
rationale for this preference. None of its reasons, however,
seems to be related to the furtherance of state interests and
policies.
232 An important goal of the 1929 Warsaw Convention was precisely to limit the
potential liability of the carrier in order to enable airlines to attract indispensable
capital. See LowENrr.L, supra note 29, 7-27, 7-28.
-3 644 F.2d 594, 625-28 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981). Where Mis-
souri wished to punish McDonnell Douglas Corp., a Missouri-based corporation, for
any wrongdoing related to an air crash in Illinois, and California wanted to shield
the defendant, who was doing business in California, from excessive liability, the
interests of Illinois in protecting airplane-related industries tipped the "scales
against the allowance of punitive damages." Id. at 626.
234 Seidelson, supra note 128, at 452 (suggesting that the New York Court of Ap-
peals would find China's interest to be more significant and would therefore apply
China's ceiling on the recovery issue).
235 Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 281-82.
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The primary reason why locus delicti tips the balance is
that "ordinarily it is the place with which both parties have
voluntarily associated themselves." 236 Moreover, the situs of
the tort is a "neutral factor, rebutting an inference that the
forum State is merely protecting its own domiciliary or
favoring its own law."23 7 Finally, the court took into consid-
eration the fact that "the place of injury was the traditional
choice of law crucible."238  Another factor, which has
equally little to do with the furtherance of state interests but
which the court considered in an attempt to escape a
Neumeier-Schultz second rule impasse, was the "protection of
reasonable [individual] expectations."23 9
In both the real Barkanic fact situation and our hypotheti-
cal fact pattern, the locus delicti was unquestionably located
in China, where both businessmen purposefully went to cre-
ate and further business opportunities for their respective
companies. With regard to the party expectations involved,
we argued above that CAAC reasonably expected a limited
recovery standard to apply to a crash entirely within the
Chinese territory.2 40 As to the plaintiffs' expectations to re-
ceive unlimited recovery for their losses,2 14 1 there are no ob-
jective reasons why plaintiffs' expectations should outweigh
the defendant's expectations, particularly in light of the
well-known liability limitations in international aviation,24
226 Id. at 283 (citing Korn, supra note 3, at 801.
227 Id. at 281-82 (citing Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 687).
238 Id. at 282; cf Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (appearing to grant
importance to the traditional choice-of-law basis in the constitutionality test).
239 Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 283 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws, § 6 (2)(d) (1969); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 327 (1980) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring); Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 684).
2140 See supra text accompanying note 199.
241 See Kreindler, supra note 219, at 530 (noting that when a client walks into his
office, "whether he finds ultimately that his rights are going to be controlled by
Warsaw, Hague or whatever, the basic assumption is that he is entitled to compensa-
tion for the loss sustained").
242 See supra note 231. Besides, would one reasonably expect to recover on an
unlimited basis for a crash on an internal Chinese flight, while under the Montreal
Agreement all recovery is on a limited basis in case of any crash of an international
flight to or from the United States?
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and even more in light of the victims' probable awareness
of the Chinese damage limitations. 43
In sum, the current New York Court of Appeals choice-of-
law analysis clearly points to the application of Chinese law
because the interests of the respective jurisdictions are ir-
reconcilable, the crash occurred in China, and, to the ex-
tent that expectations are at all relevant in the given case,
limited recovery would more closely comport with the rea-
sonable expectations of those involved.244
E. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
Now, what about the traditional escape route? Under the
current New York choice-of-law method, could the applica-
tion of the Chinese damage limitation be set aside invoking
the New York public policy exception?245 Cooney imposes a
243 The victims had travelled together to China on a number of prior occasions for
the same business purposes and received notice of the damage limitations in the
issued tickets. See Appellee's Brief, supra note 8, at 5 & 34. An interesting question
arises though where the locus delicti, unlike in Barkanic, becomes largely fortuitous,
and the accident flight is not covered by the Warsaw system (e.g., a U.S. interstate
flight). In light of Cooney, party expectations might then become an important con-
sideration. Where the defendant airline, not acting exclusively in its home state,
cannot claim to have relied on any particular law to plan its conduct, the expecta-
tion factor could even become the predominant "tie breaker" pointing to the pas-
senger's domicile. Could the passenger reasonably have expected any other law to
apply to his recovery claim than the law of his domicile or residence:
that law with which [he] was most familiar and had the greatest con-
nection.... the law which was developed in the light of and which in
so many ways governed the economic conditions that the passenger
was accustomed to; . . . the law that he no doubt made his plans
around before the fatal accident; . . . the law under which his estate
will be probated and his survivors receive their proper shares.... the
law of the state or nation where his survivors will more than likely con-
tinue to live.
Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 628 (reading the ultimate application of the law of the
victim's domicile into the Kilberg public policy exception). In other words, Cooney
allows the suggestion that the Barkanic court went too far in stating that "Kilberg and
its progeny are no longer good law." See supra text accompanying note 7.
2- Cf Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 284 (considering unavailability of contribution to
comport more closely with the reasonable expectations of both parties in con-
ducting their business affairs).
245 Id. at 284-85 (noting that the public policy concept can only be considered
"after the court has first determined, under choice of law principles, that the appli-
cable substantive law is not the forum's law") (citing Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 687).
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two-prong test.2 14 6 There must be a nexus with the forum
substantial enough to invoke its public policy,2 "47 and the
foreign law must be "truly obnoxious. 2 48
In Barkanic, the appellants did not overcome the "con-
tacts" prong. There being no relevant connection with New
York other than the fact that New York was the forum state,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
appellants failed to establish "that there [were] enough im-
portant contacts between the parties, the occurrence and
the New York forum to implicate [New York's] public policy
and thus preclude enforcement of the foreign law."2 49
But, would the court have come to the same conclusion
had the appellants been New York domiciliaries? Would,
under the current New York choice-of-law method, the
domicile connection trigger the New York public policy ex-
ception in a Barkanic-type case? There is little doubt that in
case of a New York domicile connection, New York's inter-
est in the case would be "sufficient to warrant scrutiny
under the public policy exception."25 0 The remaining ques-
tion then becomes whether a foreign law limiting damages
for wrongful death is "truly obnoxious."
In Schultz and Cooney, the New York Court of Appeals set
a high "obnoxiousness" standard for successfully invoking
the public policy exception. The court observed that a dif-
ferent "scheme of legislation ... is not enough to show that
public policy forbids [the court] to enforce the foreign
right. . . " and that the court is "not so provincial as to say
that every solution of a problem is wrong because [the
2 4 Id. at 284-85.
247 Id. at 284.
2 8 Id. at 285.
249 Barkanic II, 923 F.2d at 964 (citing Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 688).
- Cf Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 284 (holding that New York's nexus was sufficient
where a New York domiciliary might be cast in liability under foreign law that was
contrary to New York law); see also Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 688 (noting that New York's
public policy was implicated where decedent was a resident, had purchased his ticket
and boarded his flight in New York, and the defendant carried on extensive opera-
tions in New York) (referring to Kilbeig).
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court] deal[s] with it otherwise at home."251 Furthermore,
the court noted that "public policy is not measured by indi-
vidual notions of expediency and fairness or by a showing
that the foreign law is unreasonable or unwise."252
The post-Neumeier New York Court of Appeals did not yet
,have the opportunity to apply the obnoxiousness test to a
foreign or sister state limitation on recovery that would
have been otherwise applicable under the Neumeier rules. 53
In Feldman, however, the New York Supreme Court found
that the Mexican limitation on damages did not violate New
York's public policy even though it might be "distasteful to
many and [was] surely disadvantageous to the [New York]
plaintiffs." 25 4
Furthermore, referring to Feldman, the Cooney court
found that the public policy exception used in the pre-Bab-
cock cases was often nothing more than a choice-of-law
mechanism used to escape from prevailing choice-of-law
rules that permitted no flexibility.2 55 This New York Court
of Appeals' finding and its general reference to Feldman,
which expressly held that a foreign damage limitation did
not violate New York's public policy, strongly suggests that a
foreign damage limitation is not so offensive to the New
York public policy as to be "truly obnoxious."
It is worth noting that the court did not cite Kilberg as an
example of the public policy exception merely substituting
251 Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 285 (citing Justice Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil
Co., 120 N.E. 198 (N.Y. 1918)); cf. Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 688 (citing the same passage
from Loucks). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90, cmt. c (1971)
(stating that mere differences between the law of the forum and the foreign jurisdic-
tion are insufficient to justify application of the public policy exception; the foreign
law must offend fundamental policies.).
252 Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 285 (quoting Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 679).
253 Schultz involved the charitable immunity doctrine. The court did not need to
decide the obnoxiousness issue in the case because the contacts test was not satis-
fied. See Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 688-89. In Cooney, the court had to deal with a for-
eign law preventing contribution and found that "contribution [was] not a deeply
rooted tradition of the common weal" and that "availability of contribution [was]
not invariably guaranteed." Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 285.
-5 Feldman v. Acapulco Princess Hotel, 520 N.Y.S.2d 477, 488 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1987).
255 Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 285.
8091995]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
a choice-of-law mechanism.2 56 Thus, despite the court's
suggestive language in Cooney, the precise status of the New
York public policy exception with regard to damage limita-
tions in wrongful death actions is still not completely set-
tled. New York plaintiff-domiciliaries, therefore, appear
still to have an argument in future air crash cases to sustain
the "heavy burden" of proving that a damage limitation is
offensive to New York's public policy.
The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that,
under the current New York choice-of-law method, the rele-
vant factors in breaking the Barkanic-type impasse, i.e., the
locus delicti and the individual expectations, point to the ap-
plication of Chinese law. Moreover, given the extremely
high public policy standard formulated in Schultz and the
negative suggestive language in Cooney with regard to the
exception's applicability to foreign damage limitations, it is
rather unlikely in the given circumstances that the Chinese
damage cap was so "truly obnoxious" as to offend New
York's public policy.
Therefore, under the New York choice-of-law method,
the New York Court of Appeals would probably reach the
same result as the Second Circuit in a Barkanic-type case,257
applying foreign law to the recovery issue. Only a New York
plaintiff-domiciliary would have a slight chance to escape
from the foreign recovery limits by arguing the New York
public policy exception. But to invoke the New York public
policy exception successfully, the future New York plaintiff-
domiciliary would have to meet a heavy burden of proof:
He must first convince the court that the Kilberg public pol-
6 The court cited Mertz v. Mertz, 3 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 1936) (a car accident case
where wife and husband were New Yorkers and where the court invoked the public
policy exception to avoid the application of Connecticut's spousal immunity doc-
trine) as an example of a pre-Babcock case in which the same result would have been
obtained under today's choice-of-law principles. See Cooney, 612 N.E.2d at 285.
2157 Whether the New York Court of Appeals would reach the same result where
the locus delicti is completely fortuitous, unlike in Barkanic, and where the accident
flight is not covered by the Warsaw system (e.g., the crash of a U.S. interstate flight)
is at least questionable. See supra note 243 (arguing the potential viability of the
Kilberg doctrine after Barkanic).
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icy exception was real and not merely a choice-of-law escape
mechanism.
V. BARKANIC, THE IMPORTANCE OF A
SUPPLEMENTAL COMPENSATION PLAN
ILLUSTRATED
A supplemental compensation plan, not some choice-of-
law "tie breaker," should ultimately resolve a Barkanic-type
impasse. The foregoing sections have revealed the funda-
mental conflict of interests in a Barkanic-type case. To the
extent that a U.S. court allows unlimited recovery under
U.S. standards against a developing country's airline in a
Barkanic context, the developing country's policy to protect
its infant airline industry will be offended.258 Indeed, un-
limited recovery under U.S. standards usually implies an
outflow of indispensable hard currency to the United States
from a developing country with a much lower standard of
living.2 59 The country with the lower living standard will
thus ipsofacto subsidize the United States and ultimately suf-
fer a loss in balance of payments. 26  Conversely, however,
to the extent that U.S. plaintiffs receive less than their ac-
tual loss, the policy underlying a U.S. wrongful death stat-
ute providing for unlimited recovery is offended. 61
It is thus obvious, that whatever choice-of-law rule, ap-
proach, or method a court uses, the developing country's
interest cannot be accommodated without sacrificing the
- See supra note 165 and accompanying text. Recall here, however, that to the
extent the risk of hard currency outflow can be shifted to a non-Chinese entity (e.g.,
a foreign insurance company), China's interest in having its law applied could be
largely neutralized. See supra notes 165 & 213.
2- See ALEKSANDER TOBOLEWSKI, MONETARY LIMITATIONS IN AIR LAw: LEGAL, Eco-
NOMIC AND SOCIO-POLrTICAL ASPECrS 118-19 (1986).
NO Cf Special ICAO Meeting on Limits for Passengers Under the Warsaw Convention and
the Hague Protocol at 1-9, ICAO Doc. 8584-LC/154 (Feb. 1, 1966) (suggesting that an
increase in damage limitations implies an increase in insurance premiums and that
therefore all passengers would have to pay increased air fares). Only a small wealthy
percentage would benefit from the higher limit, a situation where "the peasant...
pay[s] for the comfort of the king." Id. The "peasants" are the passengers, receiving
compensation below the limit while having paid more for their ticket as a result of
the higher insurance costs. See TOBOtEwsKI, supra note 259, at 120-21.
-1 See supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
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U.S. interest and vice versa. Any choice-of-law rule, ap-
proach, or method will ultimately impair one of the in-
volved interests and fail to realize the greatest overall
effectuation of states' policies. I would suggest, therefore,
not to resolve a Barkanic-type impasse by choice-of-law, but
by a supplemental compensation plan as provided for in
the Third Montreal Protocol.2 62 Enabling legislation for a
U.S. supplemental compensation plan has been most re-
cently proposed on July 2, 1992 by Senators Mitchell and
Ford.263
The operation of the U.S. supplemental compensation
plan needs to be considered in relation to the Warsaw sys-
tem.264 This system only applies to "international air trans-
portation."265 Under the Warsaw Convention or the Hague
262 See Protocol to Amend Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage, Mar.
8, 1971, ICAO Doc. 9147 [hereinafter Third Montreal Protocol]. Article 35A of the
Third Montreal Protocol provides as follows:
No provision contained in this convention shall prevent a State from
establishing and operating within its territory a system to supplement
the compensation payable to claimants under the convention in re-
spect of death, or personal injury, of passengers. Such a system shall
fulfill the following conditions:
(a) it shall not in any circumstances impose upon the carrier, his ser-
vants or agents, any liability in addition to that provided under this
convention;
(b) it shall not impose upon the carrier any financial or administra-
tive burden other than collecting in that State contributions from pas-
sengers if required so to do;
(c) it shall not give rise to any discrimination between carriers with
regard to the passengers concerned and the benefits available to the
said passengers under the system shall be extended to them regardless
of the carrier whose services they have used;
(d) if a passenger has contributed to the system, any person suffering
damage as a consequence of death or personal injury of such passen-
ger shall be entitled to the benefits of the system.
26S 5. 2945, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(A)(3) (1992).
216 The Warsaw system refers to the body of treaties and agreements consisting of
the Warsaw Convention, supra note 11; the Protocol to Amend the Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air
Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, done Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [here-
inafter Hague Protocol]; and the Montreal Agreement, supra note 11.
26- See supra note 11. In interpreting whether a carriage is international, the U.S.
courts have generally adopted the position that the terms of the contract prevail. See
Cagle, supra note 231, at 960. The reader will recall that the "international transpor-
tation" issue and the existence of a Warsaw/Montreal cause of action was never liti-
gated in Barkanic. See supra note 11.
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Protocol, international airline liability is limited to $8,300266
and $16,600,267 respectively, unless the claimant can prove
"willful misconduct" by an airline.2 1 Under the 1966 Mon-
treal Agreement, airlines flying to and from the United
States have accepted liability up to $75,000.269 The Third
Montreal Protocol provides for a system of absolute, limited
liability. 270 For death and personal injury, the Protocol
eliminates the "willful misconduct" exception 271 and in-
creases the airline's liability to approximately $130,000.272
Additionally, the Protocol provides for a supplemental com-
pensation plan under which each Contracting State can es-
tablish and operate a system through which damages in
excess of the $130,000 limitation could be recovered.2 7
The proposed U.S. enabling legislation would amend the
1958 Federal Aviation Act to establish and operate such a
supplemental compensation plan (SCP).274 The SCP essen-
tially provides for an insurance policy. All airlines making
international flights to and from the United States would be
required to designate an agent to negotiate insurance cov-
erage with a Plan Administrator, subject to approval by the
Secretary of Transportation.2 75
All passengers embarking on international flights to and
from the United States would pay a compensation plan con-
tribution as part of the advertised ticket price up to a maxi-
mum of five dollars per ticket in 1992 dollars.2 76 For death
and personal injury, claimants would then have a right to
recover up to $130,000 directly from the airline under the
Third Montreal Protocol and an unlimited additional
2 Warsaw Convention, supra note 11, art. 22(1).
267 Hague Protocol, supra note 264, art. XI.
268 Warsaw Convention, supra note 11, art. 25.
269 Montreal Agreement, supra note 11.
270 See Third Montreal Protocol, supra note 262.
27, Third Montreal Protocol, supra note 262, art. IV (as incorporated from the
1971 Guatemala Protocol).
272 Third Montreal Protocol, supra note 262, art. II.
273 Third Montreal Protocol, supra note 262, art. XIV (as incorporated from the
1971 Guatemala Protocol).
274 See S. 2945, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. pmbl. (1992).
275 S. 2945, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1702(a) (1992).
276 Id. § 1704.
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amount for economic and non-economic injuries from the
SCP.277 The proposed legislation also provides for the law
of the domicile of the claimant as the law applicable to the
recovery claims brought in the United States under the
SCP.278
Finally, it is noteworthy that the Barkanic situation would
in any case be covered by the SCP because it expands its
unlimited coverage to U.S. citizens flying on foreign airlines
between foreign points of origin and destination, who may
not have rights of recovery under the Warsaw Conven-
tion.2 79 Therefore, where recovery exceeding the $130,000
(U.S.) limit is paid out of the SCP, which is funded exclu-
sively by the international air traveler, the SCP obviously ac-
commodates the conflicting interests involved in a Barkanic-
type case: U.S. citizens recover under U.S. standards, while
an excessive outflow of hard currency, indispensable to de-
velop a safe airline industry in a developing country, can be
avoided. By resolving the fundamental conflict of compen-
sation interests involved in a Barkanic-type case with a maxi-
mum overall effectuation of states' policies, the
supplemental compensation plan thus offers a very attrac-
tive alternative for any choice-of-law rule, approach, or
method.
VI. CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis leads to the conclusion that in
Barkanic the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit misin-
terpreted the current New York choice-of-law method. In
light of Cooney and given the line of former air crash cases
clearly favoring the law of the domicile, the Second Circuit
should certainly have checked its "Neumeier-Schultz" rule re-
sult under an interest analysis. Even so, an interest analysis
under the current New York choice-of-law method ulti-
mately leads to the same result the Barkanic court reached.
Confronted with a "true conflict," the locus delicti breaks the
277 Id. §§ 1701-1703.
278 Id. § 1703(e).
279 Id. § 1702(a).
CHOICE-OF-LAW METHOD
"tie" and points to Chinese law providing for a $20,000
damage limitation. Only a New York plaintiff has a slight
chance to overcome the foreign recovery limit under the
New York public policy exception. The required "obnox-
iousness" standard will be met only if that New York plain-
tiff can convince the court that the Kilberg public policy
exception is real and not merely a choice-of-law escape
mechanism.
Because the fundamental conflict of interests in a
Barkanic-type case cannot be fully accommodated by a
choice-of-law rule, approach, or method, I suggest resolving
this conflict by way of a supplemental compensation plan as
provided for in the Third Montreal Protocol. Such a plan
will allow U.S. citizens to fully recover under U.S. standards,
while avoiding an excessive outflow of hard currency, which
is necessary to build a safe airline industry in a developing
country, thus realizing a maximum overall effectuation of
states' policies.
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